Pragmatic reduction of the Binding Conditions revisited by Levinson, S.
J. Linguistics 27 (1991), 107-161. Printed in Great Britain
Pragmatic reduction of the Binding Conditions
revisited
STEPHEN C. LEVINSON
Department of Linguistics, University of Cambridge
Max Planck Research Group for Cognitive Anthropology, Nijmegen
(Received 20 July 1989; revised 17 August 1990)
1. I N T R O D U C T I O N
In an earlier article (Levinson, 1987 b), I raised the possibility that a Gricean
theory of implicature might provide a systematic partial reduction of the
Binding Conditions; the briefest of outlines is given in Section 2.1 below but
the argumentation will be found in the earlier article. In this article I want,
first, to show how that account might be further justified and extended, but
then to introduce a radical alternative. This alternative uses the same
pragmatic framework, but gives an account better adjusted to some
languages. Finally, I shall attempt to show that both accounts can be
combined by taking a diachronic perspective. The attraction of the combined
account is that, suddenly, many facts about long-range reflexives and their
associated logophoricity fall into place.
I shall dub my earlier reduction the 'A-first' account; the argument is
recapitulated in Section 2, but the essential characteristic is that Principle A
of the Binding Conditions is taken to be grammatically specified, as in the
GB accounts, while Principles B and C are then reduced to pragmatics (partly
in terms of pragmatic 'oppositions' to Principle A patterns). I have come to
see a number of internal problems with this account (which I shall mention
below), but the main challenge seems to be that in many languages reflexives
and pronouns are not always in complementary distribution, and this is
especially clear in languages with LONG-RANGE REFLEXIVES. In addition there
are languages with no reflexives at all, and yet with Principle B-like patterns
of pronominal anaphora, and this obviously poses a problem for an
account that makes Principle B-like patterns parasitic on Principle A. These
difficulties motivate consideration of a radical alternative, a 'B-first' account,
which takes Principle B to be basic (but pragmatic in character) and reduces
Principle A- and C-type patterns of anaphora to a parasitic (and pragmatic)
status.1 It turns out that the B-first account is essential for some
[1] At the time I proposed the A-first account, I had already toyed with the B-first account but
could not see how it could be extended to languages with grammaticalized Anaphors and
so rejected it entirely. However, Ann Farmer and Robert Harnish impressed me with the
possibilities in 1985 (see Farmer & Harnish, 1987) and Yan Huang's investigations of
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languages - no grammatical account and no A-first kind of pragmatic
account seems possible at all. But equally, a B-first account clearly fails where
there are grammaticalized Anaphors;2 in those languages, an A-first account
seems essential. Since the pragmatic apparatus used on both accounts is more
or less identical, a typological distinction between the two types of language
on the basis of different anaphoric 'strategies' might be appropriate.
However, on close examination, A-first languages seem to show evidence of
B-first patterns too. This suggests a diachronic progression from B-first
patterns to A-first patterns through the gradual grammaticalization of
Anaphors.3 Some languages, like English, provide direct evidence for such a
diachronic account. Various other facts, like the association between long-
range reflexives and logophoricity just when the reflexive has no clause-mate
antecedent, then acquire an explanation.
Before proceeding further, it may be useful to attempt to place this
approach to anaphora, and indeed linguistic explanation generally, in
the context of other approaches, in the hope that certain possible mis-
apprehensions can be simply avoided. The kind of approach explored here is
to be distinguished sharply from wholesale functional reductionism - there is
no inconsistency, for example, between this view and the assumption of rich
language universals of biological origin. For the neo-Gricean pragmatic
apparatus employed here presumes the independence, or at least partial
independence, of syntactic structures and semantic representations (the
qualification with respect to semantic representations is necessary for reasons
reviewed in Levinson, in prep., ch. 3): computation of pragmatic inferences
of these sorts must be made over a level of linguistic representation which
includes rich configurational, lexical and semantic information (see e.g.
Gazdar, 1979: 56 ff., Levinson, 1983: 122-125). Pragmatics, on this view
Chinese anaphora (1989) over the last three years forced me to reconsider the alternative
account. Another catalyst has been Karunavar Mohanan's, Ivan Sag's and David
Perlmutter's scepticism about the A-first account, based in part on the lack of
complementary distribution of reflexives and pronouns in so many languages. Largely
unpublished work by Catherine O'Connor (1987) has also been most helpful in suggesting
how the logophoricity facts (so nicely emphasized by Kuno, 1987) should be brought
within a pragmatic framework. This paper summarizes lecture four of the 1988 Nijmegen
Lectures, to appear as Levinson (in prep.), and I am grateful to that audience for a number
of helpful suggestions. Since then I have had further trenchant comments from Yan
Huang, Peter Matthews, Nigel Vincent and two anonymous reviewers for which I am most
grateful. One of these reviewers, commenting from a GB perspective, produced such useful
and incisive comments that I will refer to him or her as 'Bite'.
[2] I shall use the terms ANAPHOR and PRONOUN with systematic ambiguity. With an initial
capital they have the technical sense given to them in GB (Anaphors are reflexives and
reciprocals; Pronouns are non-reflexive pronominals); otherwise they have the ordinary
descriptive linguistic sense (anaphors are anaphoric items; pronouns are reflexive or non-
reflexive pronominals - although I will sometimes use the phrase 'plain pronoun', or just
'pronoun', in opposition to reflexives where the context will make the usage clear).
[3] By 'grammaticalization of Anaphors', I here intend the process whereby there is an
increasing tendency to read an expression (a) as necessarily referentially dependent, (b) as
bound within a restricted domain.
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(which I take to be the standard line), just provides a set of explanatory
principles, ancillary to the grammarian's normal armoury, to which the
theoretical linguist should always be ready to resort when looking for the
simplest explanation for linguistic phenomena. But because pragmatics is
the Cinderella of explanatory levels in linguistic theory, nearly all the major
theoretical frameworks underestimate the potential for pragmatic ex-
planations of phenomena they treat as semantic or syntactic. Therefore,
pragmatic proposals will often be in conflict with syntactic or semantic
proposals, as the pragmaticist sees that the pragmatic machinery developed
to handle indubitably pragmatic problems may also have application to
problems generally held to lie in the province of the grammarian. But it is
important to see that such tussles are attempts to re-apportion the burden of
explanation, to shift specific phenomena from one kind of linguistic
explanation to another, not attempts to undermine the existence of distinct
syntactic, semantic and pragmatic levels and modes of explanation, as in
some kinds of extreme functionalism. On the other hand, of course, a shift
of explanation from grammatical principles to pragmatic ones may be a
rather more fundamental change in theory than a shift of explanation from,
say, syntactic principles to lexical principles (depending somewhat on the
degree to which pragmatic explanations are thought of as strictly non-
linguistic).4
In the present instance, the phenomena at stake are certain patterns of
intra-sentential anaphora in certain languages. Since many aspects of
anaphora (for example, cross-sentential choices of antecedents) are clearly
pragmatic in nature, it seems worthwhile to see how far a pragmatic account
of intra-sentential anaphora can be pushed, what advantages it has, and
whether it may be especially appropriate for particular kinds of language. In
some cases, a grammatical account may find itself overlapped by a pragmatic
account, and yet the two accounts may be compatible and non-
redundant - as when we can find what look like pragmatically motivated
patterns which have a syntactic life of their own (a case in point, perhaps,
being the Avoid Pronoun Principle).5 But in other cases, where the force of
the grammatical account is held to lie in the unmotivated (and therefore
[4] For example, if pragmatic principles are conceived of as innate processing tendencies, as
in Sperber & Wilson (1986), they have at least some kinship with innatist accounts of
grammatical principles, whereas if they are thought of as rational solutions to problems of
communicative co-ordination (as in Grice, 1967, and those who follow him more closely),
pragmatic explanations have a rather different ontological and epistemological status. This
writer inclines to the latter view (see Levinson, 1989).
[5] Sometimes, GB theorists frankly admit functional motivation (as in the case of the Avoid
Pronoun Principle, see Chomsky, 1981: 65). Hellan (1988: 142) goes so far as to conclude
of the distribution of Anaphors vs. Pronominals in Norwegian, 'the phenomenon of
complementarity is part of syntax, even if it is clearly functionally or pragmatically




presumably innate) character of the relevant patterns, the availability of a
pragmatic account, however partial, is more of a challenge. That is the case
here, where we offer some partial pragmatic reduction of the Binding
Principles at the heart of the Government and Binding theory. Protagonists
of that theory will find much to quarrel with in what follows: lack of proper
attention to syntactic nuance, to the many alternative possible modifications
of the framework, to the possibility of radical parameterization of the
Binding Principles, and so on.6 But the purpose of the present paper is to
present a sketch of an alternative approach to certain central problems of
anaphora, which derives part of its interest from the sheer range of apparent
explanation over linguistic phylogeny, synchronic generalization and
diachronic process, grammar AND meaning, and part from the fact that the
mechanisms of explanation were developed for entirely independent
phenomena.
2. THE 'A-FIRST' ACCOUNT: PRAGMATIC REDUCTION OF BINDING
CONDITIONS B AND C
In this section, I briefly recapitulate the argument of Levinson (1987b), and
show how it might be extended to certain further linguistic phenomena.
2.1. First approximation to the problem
A pragmatic account of anaphora begins by noting that anaphoric
expressions are usually semantically general. Thus a locally anaphoric (co-
referential) reading is encouraged where a more semantically general term
like ship follows a more semantically specific term like ferry; and the reverse
ordering discourages a locally co-referential reading:
(1) (a) The ferry hit a rock. The ship capsized,
(b) The ship hit a rock. The ferry capsized.
The preference for a locally co-referential interpretation (as in (1 b)) can be
attributed to the Gricean second maxim of Quantity, which I shall call the
Informativeness Principle or I-principle for short (see Atlas & Levinson,
1981; Levinson, 1987a, b). This principle induces maximally informative and
cohesive interpretations from minimal linguistic specifications. It is balanced
by a Manner maxim or M-principle, which induces from the use of a prolix
or marked expression an interpretation that is complementary to the one that
[6] It is not always easy for the pragmaticist to exploit this work, in part because of the
tendency to neglect meaning factors, in part because of the sheer detail of alternative,
incompatible and sometimes radical revisions of the framework prompted by particular
languages. The work on the Germanic languages, Japanese and Chinese is particularly
detailed, and will be referred to below.
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would have been induced by the I-principle from the use of a semantically
general expression (this is what Horn (1985) calls the 'division of pragmatic
labour ')• Hence the association of anaphoric potential with pronouns and
NP-gaps (both semantically general), and of independent reference with full
lexical NPs:7
(2) The general anaphora pattern as M vs. I
lexical NP > pronoun > NP-gap
< M-implicates non-co-reference
I-implicates co-reference >
A third inferential principle, Grice's first maxim of Quantity (which we
shall call the Q-principle), provides a further essential ingredient. This
induces a contrastive interpretation between paired expressions of differential
semantic strength or informativeness. For example, the pair of quantifiers
<«//, some} form a Horn-scale of this kind, such that the use of the
semantically weaker some (as in some of the boys came) Q-implicates the
inapplicability of the stronger all, to yield the interpretation ' not all of the
boys came'. Only linguistic expressions that meet certain criteria - notably
salient opposition - form such Horn-scales capable of giving rise to such Q-
implicatures (see Atlas & Levinson, 1981). One such salient contrast is the
opposition between ordinary pronouns and reflexives (see Levinson, 1987 b,
for justification):
(3) The contrast (REFLEXIVE, PRONOUN) forms a Horn-scale, so that the
use of the Pronoun Q-implicates that the stronger Reflexive could not
truthfully have been used.
A final ingredient in the pragmatic account is a projection rule for
generalized conversational implicatures, to the effect that, when inconsistent
implicatures arise, priority is given according to the following hierarchy:
Q > M > I.8 Thus any tendency to read a pronoun as locally co-referential by
the I-Principle will be over-ruled by a Q-implicature to disjoint reference just
where a stronger reflexive could have been used to express co-reference.
A point that needs to be stressed (in the light of current fashions in
pragmatics) is that it is a special kind of implicature that is involved in these
generalizations, namely GENERALIZED conversational implicature (or GCIs
for short). GCIs are default interpretations, or preferred readings, in short
properties of utterance-types not utterance-tokens. They are generated by
[7] Compare the anaphoricity scale in Lakoff (1968), discussed in Koster (1986: 352 f.).
[8] The hierarchy of Q over I, and M over I is motivated by a great deal of data, although the
relative ordering of Q > M is not so firm. The underlying rationale, Chris Pinon has
suggested to me, is that (a) linguistic oppositions (as in Q and M) take precedence over
inferences based partly on knowledge of stereotypes, while (b) inferences based on semantic
'strength' (Q) takes precedence over those based on superficial form (M). See Atlas &
Levinson (1981), Horn (1985), Levinson (1987b), Levinson in prep. Ch. 2.
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certain stable interpretive heuristics, not by nonce-inference of the sort
promoted in Relevance-theory or many kinds of computational pragmatics
(see Levinson, 1989). Thus GCIs are stable, but defeasible, tendencies of
interpretation; in other words, just the sorts of things easily mistaken for
grammatical stipulations.
We now have an incipient reduction of some aspects of the Binding
Conditions, which are classically formulated as in (4):
(4) Binding Conditions
(A) Anaphors (reflexives and reciprocals) must be bound in their
governing category.
(B) (Non-reflexive) Pronouns must be free in their governing
category.
(C) A lexical NP must be free everywhere.
The argument goes as follows:
(a) Where the syntax permits, a speaker intending co-reference should use
an Anaphor by the Q-principle; the use of the weaker Pronoun will Q-
implicate disjoint reference by the Horn-scale (REFLEXIVE, PRONOUN);
(b) Otherwise, where a semantically general expression (e.g. a Pronoun) is
used, it will I-implicate local co-reference UNLESS :
(i) an Anaphor (e.g. reflexive) could have been used;
(ii) a prolix form has been used which will M-implicate the
complement of the I-interpretation from a reduced form.
Thus in (5 a) the preferred interpretation is that the NPs are disjoint (a
reflexive could have been used as in (5 a'); the non-use of a reflexive pronoun
Q-implicates that the reflexive interpretation is not intended); in (5b) the
pronoun he cannot give rise to a Q-implicature of disjointness (since a
reflexive could not be used in this position - (5 b') is ungrammatical), so there
is no higher-priority implicature to cancel the I-inference to co-reference; in
(5 c) the expression the man is prolix by contrast to he, thus M-implicating
disjointness.
(5) (a) Joh^ likes him2
(a') John! likes himselfj
(b) Johnj told her2 that hex gave her2 a valentine.
(b') *Johnj told her2 that himself gave her2 a valentine
(c) Johnx told her2 that the man3 gave her2 a valentine.
In this way, the Binding Conditions are reduced, at a level of first
approximation, as follows:
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(6) Partial reduction of the Binding Conditions
BINDING CONDITION A:
Content: 'Anaphors (reflexives and reciprocals) are 'bound' (co-




Content: 'Pronouns must be free (not co-indexed with a c-
commanding NP) in their minimal governing category'.
Pragmatic account: Given a Horn-scale pair like (himself, him}, use
of the weaker, less specific him will Q-implicate disjoint reference
wherever the reflexive could have been used (if you had meant the
stronger, more specific co-referential sub-case, you should have used
the form that encodes co-reference).
BINDING CONDITION C:
Content: 'Lexical NPs must be free (not co-indexed with a c-
commanding NP) throughout the sentence'.
Pragmatic account: two parts:
(i) just as in B, there will be a Horn-scale-like opposition between,
say, (himself, the man), such that wherever a speaker could
have used a reflexive he/she should have if co-reference is
intended;
(ii) unlike B, there will be a further opposition between the
potential use of the pronoun and the use of a lexical NP: {he, the
man} are opposed by Horn's (1985) Division of Labour: He,
being a minimal form, will encourage an I-inference to local co-
reference; the man (etc.) will M-implicate disjoint reference,
since the speaker would seem to be avoiding the I-implicatures
induced by the pronoun.
This is obviously only a partial reduction because Binding Principle A is
simply accepted as a rule of grammar; but then Binding B is given to us as
a ' mirror-image' pattern by the Q-principle, while Binding C is given by the
same principle PLUS the M-principle yielding complementary interpretations
from the use of prolix expressions. In addition, nothing is said about the
empty categories NP-trace and wA-trace which on the GB account are
assimilated to the same Binding patterns; a pragmatic account is likely to
treat these as largely independent, perhaps irreducibly syntactic, issues.9
The reduction is also only partial in another sense: it fails to predict the
[9] But the interpretation of at least some gaps (especially perhaps those treated as PRO within
the GB framework) falls naturally under the same pragmatic principles (see for example
Levinson, 1987a, b and references therein).
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following sort of alternation that seems to rely on some notion of
configurational dominance:
(7) (a) Next to him1; Johnj saw a snake (co-reference OK)
(b) ??Next to Johnj, hej saw a snake (co-reference bad)
In the earlier paper, I suggested that we might here adopt Reinhart's (1983)
proposal that builds another kind of anaphoric pattern into an expanded
Principle A (expanded to incorporate one aspect of Principle C). Reinhart
suggests that the pattern NP-c-commanding-Pronoun always allows the
pronoun to be treated as a bound variable (person-number-gender features
permitting), just as (on her account) a reflexive is a bound variable. Then we
will get a second 'mirror-image' inference by the Q-principle; namely,
wherever a Pronoun-c-commanding-lexical NP pattern is used, there will be
a presumption of disjoint reference. Thus any speaker intending co-reference
should use (7a) and not (7 b). Such a further bit of grammatical machinery
might be required for some languages like English, I suggested, but not, it
seems, for others like the Australian language Guugu Yimidhirr that I was
describing in that earlier paper (which lacks a strong opposition between
sentences corresponding to (7a, b)). I also noted that one might try to avoid
building in this extra grammatical machinery by adopting some version of
Bolinger's maxim 'Don't reintroduce (i.e. lexically specify) the topic of the
theme in the rheme'. Van Valin (1990) now urges such a solution on us,
pointing out that the two pragmatic traditions (the Griceans on the one
hand, and the 'functionalists' with their orientation to the Prague school
functional sentence perspective, on the other) promote compatible and
complementary views.
Bolinger's maxim works well (as Reinhart acknowledges) for examples like
(8 a, b). Co-reference is odd in (8 a) because the topic is ' reintroduced' as a
full NP in the rheme; it is alright in (8 b) because her is only part of the topic
her mother, thus the ban on reintroduction does not apply. However, a
problem for Bolinger's solution, Reinhart (1983) points out, is that it fails to
say anything about the opposition between (8 c) and (8d) since the co-
reference in question here (between him and Ben) is all within the rheme.
(8) (a) ??She1 thinks Mirn^ is adorable
(b) Herx mother thinks Mimix is adorable
(c) ??Mimi locked him! in Ben'Sj room
(d) Mimi locked Benj in hiSj room
But here perhaps there is a possible extension of Bolinger's account, in terms
of a distinction between rhematic core and periphery, with a second maxim
'If a topic is introduced in the rhematic core, don't reintroduce it in the
rhematic periphery'. Alternatively, and perhaps more convincingly, one may
need to note that when a verb subcategorizes for a number of non-subject
arguments, the thematic role hierarchies that hold over these arguments
restrict co-reference possibilities. Thus assuming that Patient is higher than
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Goal in such a hierarchy, and presuming a maxim of the sort 'Don't
reintroduce an NP in a lower-ranked thematic role', him and Ben in (8c)
would resist a co-referential interpretation. Van Valin is surely right that we
should explore such lines of explanation further; meanwhile I shall remain
agnostic between such a pragmatic account of the apparently configurational
constraints and Reinhart's type of solution.10
2.2. Problems for an A-first account
Various problems with such a reduction of the Binding Conditions have
become clear. There is obviously room for doubt of various kinds about the
internal argumentation. One may for example doubt that pronouns and
reflexives really form Horn-scales. If one adopts the Reinhart account of the
configurational asymmetries, one may further doubt whether the opposition
between constructions {NP-c-commanding-Pronoun vs. Pronoun-c-com-
manding-lexical NP) would really be sufficient to engender a Q-opposition of
the right kind. Both these doubts can be alleviated, for reasons I give
elsewhere (Levinson, in prep., ch. 4). Similarly, doubts about whether these
patterns of co-reference are too firm to be pragmatically induced can I think
be convincingly assuaged by examining the many circumstances under which
the 'banned' interpretations are in fact possible. For example, it is obvious
that there is a large class of cases where functional requirements over-ride
any preference for clausemate reflexives: (9a) is informative in a way in
which (9 b) is not. Similarly, although the preference for disjoint readings of
pronouns-c-commanding-lexical NPs is indeed strong, as illustrated by the
tendency to read the initial He and John as distinct in reference in (9 c), again
the preference is quite naturally over-ridden in (9d):
(9) (a) The Prime Minister is Margaret Thatcher.
(b) The Prime Minister is herself.
(c) He's doing what John told him to do.
(d) He's doing what John always does.
[10] Many difficulties remain for such a pragmatic approach. For example, the anonymous
reviewer I am calling 'Bite' points out that in the following examples, only (b) and (d) are
acceptable, as predicted by the c-command analysis, despite the reversal of thematic roles:
(a) *We gave him, John's, mother
(b) We gave John, his, mother
(c) *We gave him, to John's mother
(d) We gave John, to his, mother.
On the other hand, the range of Principle C violations exhibits a clear gradation of
acceptability, and this, together with the relative lack of theoretical motivation, leads e.g.
Roster (1986: 346-356) to propose that the effects are purely pragmatic but sensitive to
syntactic criteria (like c-command) that give differing degrees of prominence to NPs.
Further, language acquisition data (reviewed in Lust, 1986: 82 f.) shows this c-command
pattern of constraints on anaphora to be learnt very late, and subject to pragmatic over-
riding, which again suggests a functional source.
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The example in (9d) (drawn to my attention by Ivan Sag but due originally
to Bolinger) is interesting because not only do we have co-referentiality
between John and the c-commanding pronoun, but the pronoun is
referentially dependent on the name. It is not the kind of example where the
reference of the pronoun has to be antecedently given and thus the pronoun
can be held to be accidentally (or independently) co-referential with the
name.11 Again, I must leave the elaboration of these issues for elsewhere.
There are however a number of basic empirical facts that do seem to
challenge a theory of this kind. The first is the neglected but indubitable fact
that there are a number of languages which lack grammatical reflexives
altogether, and which nevertheless exhibit a preference for clausemate
disjointness of pronominal NPs (i.e. a Principle B-like pattern). This is
puzzling on my account because, as already stated, the A-first account
makes Principle B-like patterns arise as 'mirror-image' inferences from a
Principle A; but such languages clearly have no Principle A as they have no
Anaphors. The facts about these languages have simply not been properly
considered in nearly all the recent theorizing about anaphora, and yet they
seriously undermine all existing accounts. Because of the neglect, I discuss
some of the basic facts in Section 3 below.
Another range of facts that do not seem to fit well with the A-first account
are the many exceptions to the tendency for Anaphors and Pronominals to
be in complementary distribution.12 Sometimes either a reflexive or a
pronoun can be used without making an apparent difference in reference: in
short, in some locations the opposition in anaphoric potential is neutralized.
Although the phenomenon is most prominent in other languages, its
occurrence in English has also been much discussed, and recently in depth by
Kuno (1987). For example, although there is a difference between (10a),
which requires co-reference, and (10 b), which permits it, in both cases the
natural interpretation is the same as far as reference is concerned:13
(10) (a) John pulled the blanket towards himself,
(b) John1 pulled the blanket towards
[11] Consider:
A: 'How was the international chess match?'
B: 'Oh theyi went and did what the Russiansl always do and won every single game'
Or (after Koster, 1986: 347, after Bolinger):
A: 'What did you do for Christmas?'
B: 'We gave hert the Italian holiday our daughteri always wanted to have.'
[12] I am grateful to K. Mohanan for insisting on proper attention to this issue.
[13] Peter Matthews points out to me that in cases like (10 b) there may be a systematic prosodic
difference between unstressed him (non-co-referential) and stressed him ('reflexive').
Although such a prosodic marking is natural, I am not sure it is essential; indeed, to make
a Matthewsian point, since prosodic features are continuous and the interpretive feature in
question binary, it would seem unlikely that stress could be more than one available mode
of directing a recipient towards a 'disambiguation'. In any case, in the analysis to be
outlined in Section 3, marked (including stressed) NPs are claimed to M-implicate the
complementary interpretation to that which would arise from the use of the corresponding
unmarked NP - thus the observation falls within the theory.
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Obviously, such cases are a serious difficulty for a GB account which has the
same definition of governing category for both Anaphors and Pronouns,
thus requiring that wherever a reflexive can occur co-referential with a
specific antecedent, a pronoun must be construed as disjoint in reference to
the same antecedent. It is equally clear that they may pose a problem for our
pragmatic account: what happens to the alleged Q-inference from the use of
the pronoun to the inapplicability of the reflexive?
A pragmatic account, however, is not necessarily embarrassed by the
failure of such complementary distribution, for the Q-inference to disjoint
reference is only a defeasible implicature. Thus if we can show that there are
systematic reasons why the implicature should be cancelled in just these
cases, no problems will arise. In many cases such an explanation would seem
to be correct. It may be useful to divide the cases into two classes: those
where the Q-implicature fails to arise because the semantic basis for it does
not obtain, and those where inconsistent background knowledge (as always)
cancels the preferred interpretation.
In the first class, the Q-implicature normally arising from the Horn-scale
(REFLEXIVE, PRONOUN) may fail to arise where these alternatives are no
longer ordered by semantic informativeness. For example, in cases like (11)
and (12) (after Reinhart, 1983), the (a) sentences with Anaphors clearly have
different truth-conditions from the (b) sentences with Pronouns: (11 a) may
describe a situation in which Felix got many votes but he was the only
candidate who voted for himself, while (11 b) necessarily describes a situation
in which Felix only got one vote (his own). Similarly, (12 a) may describe a
situation where each boy likes all the books other than his own, while (12 b)
requires that each boy likes all the books, or at least his own.
(11) (a) Only Felix voted for himself,
(b) Only Felix! voted for
(12) (a) The boys like each other's books,
(b) The boySj like their1 books
The different truth-conditions clearly stem from the difference between
Pronominals and Anaphors under quantification (note though that matters
are far from simple, the pronoun in ( n b ) resisting treatment as a bound
variable, that in (12 b) encouraging it). But whatever the source for the
difference in truth-conditions, it is clear that in these exceptional cases the
sentences with the plain pronouns are potentially MORE INFORMATIVE than
the sentences with the reflexives, that is to say they describe more restric-
tive circumstances. Thus the scale of informativeness responsible for
Q-implicatures does not apply here. Or to put the matter another way, the
truth-conditional differences will warrant the use of a co-referential
clausemate pronoun: where a speaker might wish to express a particular
proposition which requires a co-referential interpretation which would not
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be available if a reflexive were used, the use of a pronoun will not necessarily
suggest a disjoint reading.14
The other class of systematic exceptions are those where background
knowledge over-rides a preferential interpretation. Example (10) above may
be a case in point. In order for John to pull a blanket towards some third
party, and assuming that the blanket is to be used as a cover in the normal
way, he must naturally be behind that party; but then it is unlikely that he
can reach it. Thus there is a temptation to read John and him as co-
referential, despite the fact that a reflexive might have been used instead.
That this is more a matter of likely scenario than anything else is shown by
altering the lexical content, so that the normal preferential interpretation
reappears:
(13) (a) John directed the missile towards himself,
(b) ??John1 directed the missile towards him!
So, in many cases, we may be able to argue that the Q-Implicature never
arises or arises but is cancelled by inconsistent assumptions. And such
arguments would favour the pragmatic approach to disjoint reference since
we would in each case be dealing with a principled defeasibility. However,
such a piecemeal approach proves unconvincing once the widespread nature
of this failure of complementary distribution is appreciated. Thus we need to
consider the possibility of a more general account, one that can handle what
in many cases looks like genuine neutralization.15
[14] Examples like (11) are generally agreed to pose serious problems for a configurational
account of disjoint reference conditions (cf. for example Hellan, 1988: 140). Nevertheless
one might attempt (after Higginbotham, 1980: 697 f. and 'Bite') such an account as
follows: in (11 a) the quantified phrase Only Felix, but not the NP Felix, c-commands the
reflexive, allowing the bound-variable reading; so too in ( n b ) the pronoun is not c-
commanded by Felix, and so is not bound but free. Much depends here on the construal
of c-command of course, but regardless of that, one can find adverbial or conjunctive
paraphrases of only that make it clear that the overlapping distribution of Pronoun vs.
Anaphor is determined by the need to make a meaning distinction, not by configurational
rules, as in the following alternatives to (11):
(i) (a) (No-one else in the committee wanted to vote for Felix.) Alone of all the
committee members, Felix, voted for himself,,
(b) (No-one else in the committee wanted to vote for Felix.) Alone of all the
committee members, Felix, voted for him,,
(ii) (a) (No-one else in the committee wanted to vote for Felix but) Felix, voted for
himself, and was the only person to do so.
(b) (No-one else in the committee wanted to vote for Felix but) Felix, voted for
him, and was the only person to do so.
[15] 'Bite' points out that the possibilities of a syntactic basis for this neutralization have not
been exhausted. For example, suppose that locative/directional PPs may optionally have
implicit subjects (as argued for nominals by Chomsky, 1986: 167 ff.), then towards him in
(10) may optionally have the subject blanket, in which case him is free (as required by
Binding Condition B) even when understood as co-referential with John. Where the PP is
not construed as having an implicit subject, co-reference must be indicated by the reflexive,
as required by Binding Condition A. This syntactic PP-ambiguity, carrying with it
alternations of Pronoun vs. Anaphor, might then be the structural basis for the semantic
nuances that Kuno and others have attributed directly to a choice between Pronoun and
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2.3. Q-contrasts and logophoricity
The problem, then, is how to explain the apparent true neutralization
between plain pronoun and reflexive in cases like the following, where,
despite the fact that the reflexive is necessarily referentially dependent and
the pronoun only optionally so, we tend to assign the same reference to both:
(14) (a) John found a snake near him/himself
(b) He spilled the milk all over him/himself
(c) He wrapped the cloak around him/himself
We should note that not only do we obtain pronouns where we expect
reflexives because of clausemate antecedents (as in (14)), but we also
sometimes find reflexives where we expect plain pronouns, with antecedents
beyond the immediate clause (let us call these LONG-RANGE REFLEXIVES):16
(15) (a) John thought that Mary criticized everyone but himself/him
(Keenan, 1987)
(b) Mary said to John that she knew that the paper had been written
by Ann and himself/him (Ross, 1970)
(c) Mary said to John that there was a picture of himself/him in the
newspaper (Kuno, 1987)
The grammarians have been hard at work to explain such cases, but Kuno
(1987) argues convincingly that no existing syntactic account is successful.
Instead, he points out that there are subtle meaning differences expressed by
choosing a pronoun or a reflexive in these cases. Thus the neutralization is
only at the level of reference; there remains a semantic/pragmatic contrast.
For example, turning first to the case of clausemate co-referential pronouns,
Kuno points out that (16 a) suggests that John lifted up the book and put it
behind him, whereas (16 b) suggests rather that John manoeuvred himself
between the viewer and the book.
Anaphor. Obviously, such an account cannot be ruled out; equally clearly it will not
generalize to explain the similar semantic/pragmatic nuances associated with 'long range
reflexives' to be discussed below.
[16] The terms 'long distance binding' (Chomsky, 1986: 174), 'long reflexivization' (Everaert,
1986: ch. 8), 'non-clause bound reflexivization (NCBR)' (Anderson, 1986: 68 ff.), and the
like have been used often without clear definition. From a GB point of view, one needs to
distinguish the more general case where reflexives are bound outside their governing
category, from the sub-case where they are bound across an S-boundary (and within the
latter, across S vs- S-bar, tensed vs. untensed, subjunctive vs. indicative INFL, etc.). From
a pre-theoretical point of view, one needs perhaps to distinguish at least the three cases: (a)
where reflexive and antecedent are both subcategorized arguments of the verb ('short
reflexivization' perhaps); (b) where reflexive and antecedent are within the same clause, but
the reflexive is in an adjunct phrase like a PP; (c) where reflexive and antecedent lie in
different clauses ('long reflexivization' proper or NCBR). (Foley & Van Valin's (1983)
typology of junctures might bring more precision here.) Although the (c) class is the focus




(16) (a) John hid the book behind him.
(b) John hid the book behind himself.
Similarly, turning to the case of the long-range reflexives, Kuno draws
attention to a more general kind of meaning difference:
(17) (a) Mary said to John that there was a picture of himself in the
newspaper.
(b) Mary said to John that there was a picture of him in the
newspaper.
(c) ??Mary said of John that there was a picture of himself in the
newspaper.
(d) Mary said of John that there was a picture of him in the
newspaper.
Kuno suggests that the meaning difference between (17 a) and (17 b) is
essentially one of POINT OF VIEW: the use of the reflexive obliges us to take
John's point of view, while the use of the pronoun allows the normal, deictic,
objective point of view.17 That this is what is involved is shown by the
opposition between (17 c) and (i7d): here the matrix predicate said of forces
the objective point of view (because John cannot be part of the reported
event), and hence the reflexive is odd. Looking back at the cases where
pronouns can be used with clausemate antecedents, the same general
opposition is often clear:
(18) (a) He pushed the brandy away from him.
(b) He pushed the brandy away from himself.
(18a) invokes a 'camera angle' from across the room as it were, while (18b)
invokes a 'camera angle' from the protagonist's own viewpoint.18
Now this association of a subtle meaning difference in 'point of view' with
long-range reflexives is a phenomenon reported in much recent research on a
great range of languages often under the rubric of LOGOPHORICITY. The
concept of logophoricity was developed by Hagege (1974) in response to the
phenomenon in African languages like Ewe, Tuburi and Mundang where
there are special anaphoric pronouns (sometimes with additional verbal
[17] For some earlier interesting observations here, see Can trail, 1974, who emphasized the
empathetic flavour of long range reflexives, thus explaining the following kind of example
(p. 44): / can understand a father wanting his daughter to be like himself but I can't
understand that ugly brute wanting his daughter to be like him!
[18] There must be some doubt, 'Bite' points out to me, that all these classes of cases should
really be handled by the same theory. Against assimilating reflexives in PPs and picture
NPs with the 'long-range' reflexives, there are some tendencies to locality restrictions in the
former cases (as predicted for example by Chomsky, 1986: 164 ff.) and not in the latter.
Perhaps intuitions differ, but the following kind of example (with an intervening thematic
subject) seems to me to undermine this possible contrast:
(i) Stalin! bragged to Churchill that Picasso had painted a picture of himself
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affixes) which refer to an antecedent from whose point of view events are
being described. Such pronouns are necessarily referentially dependent and
in this respect are just like reflexives, but unlike the items normally referred
to as long-distance reflexives, they cannot occur with clausemate ante-
cedents. In both cases, however, it is systematically reported that the
logophoric pronoun or long-distance reflexive is optional. In other words, a
plain pronoun can be used instead with identical (co)-reference (see Stirling,
1988: ch. 7 for details). It is the long-distance reflexives that interest us here
just because they occur both 'short-range' (with clausemate antecedents)
and 'long-range' (with antecedents beyond the clause), and there has been
much work on such reflexives, especially in Icelandic and other Germanic
languages, Chinese and Japanese.19
A serious review of this work is beyond the scope of this paper, but the
basic phenomenon can be illustrated as follows. If we use self as a gloss for
the reflexive in these languages, then the distribution of the reflexive is
illustrated by the English glosses in (19):
(19) (a) John hit self.
(b) John said that self would come.
(c) John said that Bill would hit self.
Some instantiations of these sorts of patterns, drawn from Kuno's (1987)
discussion, follow:
(20) Latin (from Kuno, 1987: 137)
Petierunt ut sibi liceret
begged-3PL that to-themselves be-allowed
' They begged that it might be allowed to them'
(21) Japanese (ibid.)
Taroo wa zibun ga tensei da to omotte iru
self genius is that thinking is
Taroo [self a genius is] thinks
'TaroOj thinks that he's a genius/
(22) Korean (ibid. 139)
John-i Bill-eykey caki-ka am-i-la-ko malhayssta
John-NOM Bill-DATiVE self-NOM cancer-be-that said
John to Bill [that self has cancer] said
j said to Bill that he1 has cancer'
[19] See for example Yang (1983), Sells, Zaenen & Zee (1987), Kuno (1987) for general
references; Everaert (1986), Hellan (1988), Hellan & Christensen (1986) and references
therein for Germanic; Kuno (1987), Sells (1987) and their references for Japanese; Huang
(1983), Battistella (1985, 1989), Y. Huang (1989) and references for Chinese.
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(23) Icelandic (ibid. 141; Maling, 1984)
Jon segir ath Haraldur viti ath Maria elski sig
Jon says that Harald knows+ SUBJV that Maria loves self
'Johnj says that Harald knows that Mary loves h im/
As mentioned, in nearly all the languages for which we have reports, a non-
reflexive pronoun can be used with the same reference in the same or similar
environment.20 From a GB perspective, this at least requires that Principle A
and Principle B of the Binding Conditions operate with distinct but
overlapping binding domains. However, a problem for that solution is that
in a number of these patterns the reflexive can take an antecedent beyond,
sometimes way beyond as in (23), the nearest accessible subject. Thus we are
faced with Anaphors (if such they are) with apparently unlimited binding
domains. The syntactic constraints then border on the vacuous and we are
left with what really amounts to little more than the semantic restriction of
necessary referential dependence.
The data are complex, and in various ways diverse, so it is still not clear
how similar the patterns are across languages. For example, there is
obviously an important distinction between those languages that permit
long-range reflexives in subject position (like Chinese, Japanese, Korean) and
those (like some of the Germanic languages)21 that do not. Further, some
languages (like the Germanic ones) have more than one reflexive form, only
one of which participates in long-distance reflexivization, and which are
subject to constraints that vary in intricate ways across the Germanic
languages (see for example Everaert, 1986: 212 ff.; Hellan, 1988: ch. 2 and
my footnote 28). Nevertheless, one clear generalization does seem to
emerge, and that is that these long-range reflexives seem to be closely
associated with (what may be loosely called) a 'logophoric' point of view,
that is to say with the subjective perspective of the referent of the antecedent
of the reflexive.
Attempts have been made (by Sells, 1987 and Stirling, 1988 among others)
to distinguish different aspects of this semantic nuance. Sells (1987) factors
out the following semantic ingredients: the relativization of deixis to a
particular protagonist's (the PIVOT'S) point of view, the point of view of a
reported speaker (the SOURCE), and the protagonist from whose mental
perspective an event is being reported (the SELF). In the prototypical
[20] Sometimes the logophoric long-distance reflexive may require mood changes; thus
Icelandic long-distance reflexives mostly require a subjunctive clause (but see Hellan, 1988:
89 and references therein). But the general optionality of logophoric pronouns and long-
distance anaphors is fairly clear if unhighlighted in the literature (see Anderson, 1986: 66
re Icelandic; Everaert, 1982: 2 re Dutch; Stirling, 1988: 247 f. re the African languages).
[21] For example, Icelandic permits only non-nominative subject anaphors (Everaert, 1986:
172, 302 IT.), although this seems to be nothing more than a morphological gap as shown
by the possibility of oblique case reflexive subjects (Anderson, 1986: 69 f.).
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'logophoric' contexts, namely reported speech events, these perspectival
centres coincide on one individual, but in other contexts (like complements
of 'psych-verbs') only one or two of these perspectives may be involved
(Sells, 1987: 456). In the African languages which gave rise to the original
'logophoric' analysis (Hagege, 1974), in a prototypical logophoric context
which might, e.g. be glossed as Bill said he would come, co-reference together
with the coincidence of subjective perspectives is encoded (often) by a special
pronoun. In the case of long-distance reflexives, like Japanese zibun, we seem
to be dealing with looser requirements. For instance, according to Sells'
analysis, zibun requires that the antecedent be the ' pivot' or centre to which
deixis has been relativized, while antecedents of Icelandic long-range
reflexives have to be a different kind of perspectival centre, namely the person
from whose mental life the scene is viewed (the self). And so on. But although
the details of the requirements that antecedents of long-range reflexives have
to meet vary slightly from language to language, the essential point Sells
establishes is that what is suggested by the use of the reflexive in such
languages is a contrast with the ordinary, objective, 'deictic' point of view,
that of an uninvolved observer.
Stirling (1988: ch. 6), while adopting Sells' treatment in terms of Discourse
Representation Theory (DRT) of the conditions put on antecedents by
logophoric predicates and pronouns, argues that Sells' tripartite decompo-
sition of the relevant notions is over-elaborate: she instead argues that we
only need to distinguish between the relativized deictic centre (Sells' pivot)
and the VALIDATOR of the utterance, that is the person who vouches for the
described situation. Where the validator is not the current speaker, but rather
for example some reported speaker, we are dealing with a logophoric
context. This account seems more in line with O'Connor's (1987) observation
that logophoric items have collocational restrictions with evidentials.22
Here we must leave aside all these complexities both in the language-
specific distribution of long-range reflexives and the exact analysis of the
semantic nuances involved. But this recurrent reporting of such a perspectival
meaning difference between the use of a pronoun and the use of a reflexive
is crucial to a pragmatic account of Binding, BECAUSE IT REVIVES THE
POSSIBILITY OF A Q-IMPLICATURE CONTRAST BETWEEN PRONOUN AND REFLEXIVE
EVEN WHERE THEY MAY BOTH OCCUR WITH THE SAME REFERENCE. F o r a Q - b a s e d
contrast should be a contrast in informativeness, but not necessarily a contrast
[22] Stirling also treats the validator as a deictic discourse referent entered into the top level of
a Discourse Representation Structure, in contrast to Sells' treatment of his three roles as
predicated restrictions on discourse referents. This would seem to avoid a technical
difficulty that Sells fails to see, namely that on his account the roles would fall under the
scope of negation, incorrectly predicting that some sentence glossing as 'John didn't say
that self would come' might mean that John said that he would come but 'he ' was not
logophoric! The point is that the proper treatment of 'presuppositional', background
pragmatic conditions in DRT has not been properly thought through.
123
STEPHEN C. LEVINSON
in referential possibility. It will be sufficient for a pragmatic account that the
use of the pronoun should invoke an interpretation that is less informative
than that invoked by the reflexive. This line of reasoning has in fact already
(and quite independently of my endeavours) been explored by O'Connor
(1987). Considering the details of both long-range reflexives and switch
reference in Northern Porno, she came to the conclusion that disjoint
reference is not encoded by either pronouns or ' switched reference' markers;
rather, as we have claimed for disjoint reference generally, it is implicated
(she appeals to Reinhart's account in terms of a Manner maxim, but we can
assimilate the account to our Q-implicature). Noting the overlap in
distribution between long-range reflexives and pronouns, she notes that if we
take the reflexive to encode two meaning elements, co-reference and
logophoricity, then the use of the pronoun will be warranted wherever the
speaker wishes to avoid co-reference, logophoricity or both. In our terms we
have a Q-contrast between the reflexive and the ordinary pronoun,
schematically :23
self he I she /it
f+logophoric 1 I",+logophoric 1
[+locally co-referentialJ [ +referential dependency]
Thus, we have a Horn-scale: <LONG-REFLEXIVE, PRONOUN), such that the
use of the pronoun Q-implicates EITHER disjoint reference OR non-
logophoricity (or both). For example, take, in English gloss, the case of a
language (like Japanese or Korean in (21) and (22) above) that allows a
nominative long-distance anaphor (here glossed 'self') to alternate with a
nominative pronominal (here glossed 'he ' ) :
(24) (a) John said that self lacked ability
(b) John said that he lacked ability
(24 a) encodes both logophoricity (or protagonist's perspective) and necessary
referential dependence (or co-reference); thus the use of the less informative
(24 b), unmarked for either referential dependency or logophoricity,
implicates that the speaker wishes to avoid at least one of the features
encoded by the reflexive. A co-referential interpretation for the ordinary
pronoun in (24 b) is not therefore ruled out. If there is reason to think that
the speaker wishes to avoid a logophoric interpretation, then that will be
[23] Compare Kuno's (1987: 141) conjunctive definition of the conditions under which
Icelandic long-range reflexives can be used: 'A reflexive pronoun can be used in a
complement clause in Icelandic if it is co-referential with a [+logo-1] NP of the main clause
AND if the complement clause is an expression of the logophoric NP's point of view rather
than the speaker's rendition of it' (where the [+logo-i] feature marks the source of a
reported speech event - e.g. John in John told Mary he'd come - or more generally the
experiencer). The conjunctive conditions for usage of the reflexive have as corollary
DISJUNCTIVE conditions for the co-operative use of the pronoun: use the pronoun when
either or both of the conditions for the use of the reflexive do not obtain.
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sufficient reason for him to have avoided the reflexive. The Q-inference to
non-logophoric viewpoint will then be consistent with the lower priority I-
inference to co-reference, and both will go through. So now we have a Q-
contrast that may or may not be a contrast in reference - hence the
neutralization in reference (but not in overall meaning) in these positions. In
contrast to such a pragmatic account, a GB theorist will be forced into
positing different binding domains for pronouns and reflexives in order to
account for their overlapping distribution. But experience shows that it is not
easy to get such an account to work (Kuno, 1987). Chinese has been a test
bed for theories of this sort (see Huang, 1983; Huang, 1984; Battistella,
1985; Iatridou, 1986), but recent work by Y. Huang (1989) strongly suggests
that a pragmatic account is inevitable.
If we now look back at Kuno's observations about English 'neu-
tralizations' of this sort, it seems that O'Connor's conjecture might have
application here too:
(25) English logophoricity (Kuno, 1987: 120 ff.)
(a) According to John, it was written by Ann and himself
(b) ?? Speaking of John, it was written by Ann and himself
If we take it that the long-range reflexive encodes a subjective point of view,
then that would explain the oddity in (25 b) of the collocation of an a-
logophoric adverbial with a long range reflexive. O'Connor's conjecture thus
reinvigorates the pragmatic account of Binding possibilities, explaining the
apparent neutralizations between pronouns and reflexives that sometimes
occur. But there is a difficulty for the pragmatic account that we have not
faced up to. (It is a difficulty, I should add, for grammatical accounts too.)
This is that the neutralization in reference between pronoun and reflexive,
and the associated difference in logophoricity, only arises in certain locations.
In English, one class of such locations are the peripheral adjuncts within the
clause (as in away from him/himself in (18)); another class, more prominent
in other languages, consists of the long-range reflexives. The residual
problem for the pragmatic account thus comes down to this: why should the
issue of logophoricity not arise in the contrast between reflexive and pronoun
when these have core-argument clausemate antecedents? For many lan-
guages the same reflexive morpheme occurs in both clausemate and long-
range contexts, as in the gloss below:
(26) (a) John hit self \ [a referential rather than a
(b) J o h ^ hit him2 j logophoric contrast]
(c) John said self would come \ [a logophoric, not always
(d) Johnx said hem would come] a referential, contrast]
But only in (26 c) does the logophoric meaning seem to arise, just where the
pronoun can routinely occur with the same reference. The question is thus
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posed, on O'Connor's pragmatic account, why one can't say John hit him (or
its equivalent in languages with logophoric reflexives) suggesting co-reference
but an a-logophoric viewpoint. With clausemate antecedents the contrast
always seems to be one of reference simpliciter, but with antecedents beyond
the clause (or with an anaphor in an adjunct and the antecedent within the
clause) the contrast between pronoun and reflexive can now be EITHER a
contrast in reference OR a contrast in logophoricity. One might claim, as
Bouchard, Sells and others have, that true reflexives are restricted to the co-
reference between core-argument clausemates, the rest being merely
homophonous contrastive pronouns of a special sort.24 But then we need an
explanation for the cross-linguistic tendency for such homophony. Al-
ternatively, one might seek for a further pragmatic factor that explains the
over-riding concern with reference within the clause. This is the direction we
shall now explore.
2.4. Conclusions re the 'A-first' pragmatic analysis
The A-first account is, I think, still a perfectly viable account of disjoint
reference preferences in most languages which exhibit grammaticalized
Anaphors. There are areas where it no doubt requires further exploration, as
for example in the possibility of replacing Reinhart's configurational
account of the disjointness of a pronoun c-commanding a lexical NP with an
elaborated version of Bolinger's approach making use of theme/rheme
distinctions. There are also areas where the account can be extended to deal
with other related phenomena, as argued by O'Connor: for example, the
indication of disjoint reference by switch reference systems may be implicated
rather than coded, and the contrast between pronoun and long-range
reflexive may consist in a Q-implicature from the use of the pronoun to the
effect that EITHER reference is disjoint OR the perspective is non-logophoric.
Nonetheless, there remain some difficulties. The first is that the A-first
account will obviously fail to say anything at all about anaphora in
languages that lack coded Anaphors. The second is that, as just reviewed,
there seems to be a need for an independent explanation of the strong
presumption of disjointness within the clause: such that in this location, a
pronoun always Q-implicates disjoint reference with a clausemate ante-
cedent rather than a-logophoricity.
3. THE 'B-FIRST' ACCOUNT: PRAGMATIC REDUCTION OF BINDING
CONDITIONS A AND C
I now want to explore a radical alternative to the preceding account which,
it will be recalled, accepted Principle A of the Binding Conditions as a basic
[24] See for instance Bouchard, 1983.
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rule of grammar, and developed pragmatic reductions of Principles B and C
as parasitic on A. In this alternative, we shift the centre of the account and
make the Principle B pattern basic and treat Principle A and Principle C as
pragmatic derivatives. I believe that such an alternative account may be
attractive for some languages at certain points in their history; and since the
account uses the same pragmatic apparatus I see no theoretical inconsistency
between what I shall call the 'A-first' and the 'B-first' accounts. Rather, any
one language (now being thought of as a sociolinguistic entity) should be
treated as having stabilized a particular pattern of anaphoric interpretation
as basic, as the conceptual anchorage for the rest of the system. This
stabilized core (whether Principle A-like or Principle B-like) is then subject
to our familiar Q, I and M inferences, yielding 'for free' the rest of the
system. All this amounts to a kind of parameterization of the pragmatics of
anaphora; as on a GB account the language learner will find the relevant
values of the parameter from the environment, but unlike GB the range of
parametric variation would seem to derive from alternative applications of
the same pragmatic principles, rather than from innate linguistic constraints.
Later I will argue that in fact A-first languages tend to exhibit residues of a
B-first stage, thus showing that there is no radical discontinuity between
these types.
Here is how a B-first account might be developed. First we take it that we
have a stabilized pattern of interpretation where clausemate NPs are
preferentially interpreted as distinct in reference. This could be thought of as
a matter of grammatical stipulation, Principle B surfacing as part of Universal
Grammar. But it need not be - and this is one of the attractions of the B-first
account - for the core pattern could itself be pragmatically motivated.
Farmer and Harnish (1987), for example, have advanced this as the basic
datum for pronominal anaphora: they propose a pragmatic 'Disjoint
Reference Presumption', namely that 'the arguments of a predicate are
intended to be disjoint, unless marked otherwise' (1987: 557). The origin of
such a pragmatic presumption is left unclear on their account, but we may
perhaps be able to relate it to our Generalized Conversational Implicatures
framework. For it would seem to be a matter of inductive fact that agents
normally act upon entities other than themselves; the prototypical
action - what is described by the prototypical transitive clause - is one agent
acting upon some entity distinct from itself. If that is how the world
stereotypically is, then an interpretation of an arbitrary transitive sentence as
having referentially distinct arguments is given to us by the I-principle, which
encourages and warrants an interpretation to the stereotype.25
[25] 'Bite' took this paragraph to be advocating a radical behaviourism: the language of
transitive clauses, inductively learnt, mirrors the world of causal events. That is not the
point being advocated. The I-principle is a principle of default interpretation, which
capitalizes on the under-specification of linguistic meaning together with the mutual
knowledge of inductive regularities in the world, to yield rich interpretations as hypotheses
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Perhaps the derivation of the preference for disjoint arguments of a single
clause is not so simple. Why shouldn't the Piagetian egocentric child arrive
at the contrary presumption, that prototypical events (like scratching
oneself) involve the agent acting on itself? And what if the inductive facts are
out of line with our stereotypes (as in Putnam's example of the stereotypical
ferocity of the gorilla)? And if the non-reflexive stereotypical relation is
sufficient explanation for the markedness of the reflexive relation, what else
is going to explain why languages always opt for marking the object rather
than the subject (*heself hit John)'! The queries can be answered in fairly
obvious ways, but they do perhaps point to the need for a theory of
stereotypes and their inductive basis rather than a rhetorical gesture.26
But whether we take the Principle B-like pattern itself to be given
pragmatically or not, we can then derive the Principle A pattern this way.
First note that reflexives and other Anaphors are MARKED forms; if they are
pronoun-like in grammatical category they tend to be longer, more
morphologically complex than ordinary pronouns (compare himself with
him); if reflexivity is encoded on the verb (as arguably in Australian anti-
passives), then the verbal morphology is marked. Thus, what the marked,
prolix forms indicate is that the normal, stereotypical scenario associated
with a transitive clause does not in fact obtain - notice is served by M-
implicature that the I-inference to the stereotype is not intended. If the
stereotype is disjoint reference for arguments, then the M-implicature is (by
Horn's (1985) division of pragmatic labour) to the complement of that
interpretation, that is to co-reference. Hence (given that, by our projection
rules for implicatures, M-implicatures cancel any rival I-implicatures) we
about utterance-meaning. Like most pragmatic theories (certainly of the Gricean sort), the
pragmatic apparatus is presumed to be parasitic on an independent syntax, and on an at
least partially independent semantics (in this instance, of transitive clauses). What is at
stake here is whether, in the B-first languages shortly to be described, disjoint reference of
clausemate NPs is given by some principle (such as Binding Principle B) of Universal
Grammar, or whether disjoint/conjoint reference is part of the underspecification of
linguistic meaning just mentioned, to be resolved at a pragmatic level. I entertain the latter
hypothesis, for the reason, to be illustrated below, that otherwise co-reference of
clausemate NPs in languages without Anaphors would be (incorrectly) predicted to be
impossible.
[26] My thanks to the same gadfly reviewer 'Bite', who remarked 'it is typical of the
functionalist perspective to be rather blase about its radical innatist tendencies while taking
more serious proposals to task'. He or she also raised the issue of Exceptional Casemarking
('Subject-to-Object Raising' or 'S-Bar deleting') contexts as in: Johni revealed him-
self1lhim1 to be a Mason, where him must belong to the lower clause, so could not be
subject to our pragmatic preference for disjoint reference, so cannot be a context where the
reflexive can be accounted for as marking the complementary interpretation. The response
is that were these contexts to be the central uses of reflexives then our theory would
collapse. But of course they are not; they are even absent from (or exist only in residual
forms in) closely related languages like German (Hawkins, 1986: 77). They do of course
convincingly show that there are syntactic rules for the use of the reflexive in
English - but that is not in question. What is in question is whether there is functional
motivation for the central pattern.
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derive the Principle A-like pattern for marked pronouns, so called
' Anaphors'. It remains to account for the Principle C-like pattern. Here the
account is familiar: where a pronoun is not a clausemate with another NP
(thus the pragmatic Principle B-like pattern is not in play), there will be
nothing to prevent the I-implicated tendency to co-reference (assuming
matched agreement features, etc.). But if, just where such a pronoun would
so implicate co-reference, a marked form (in this case a lexical referring
expression) is employed instead, then again we get the complementary
interpretation, this time to disjoint reference.
Thus, to recapitulate: sentence (27a) is interpreted with disjoint arguments
in line with the (I-induced) stereotype 'clausemate arguments are distinct';
the marked form of the pronoun in (27b) warns (M-implicates) 'contrary to
stereotype', and since M-implicatures over-ride I-implicatures, we obtain a
conjoint interpretation; the pronoun in (27c) on the other hand does not fall
under the presumption of clausemate disjointness since the only potential
antecedent is in another clause; the pronoun is unmarked, so there is nothing
to stop the I-preference for co-referentiality of reduced forms going through;
while in (27d), by contrast, the use of a full lexical NP suggests (M-
implicates) that whatever might have been implicated by the use of the
pronoun is being avoided, and thus that the complement of the interpretation






















There is rather a lot of evidence of different kinds in favour of a B-first
pragmatic analysis of this kind for at least certain languages. One form of
support comes from typological evidence for a widespread association of
reflexives and emphatics; in language after language, the reflexive seems to
be homophonous with an emphatic particle or affix (Moravcsik, 1972;
Langacker & Munro, 1975).27 For example, just as in English we have the
[27] The term 'emphatic' is (as Faltz, 1985: 239 remarks) regrettably vague. Without
attempting any careful analysis, we may note though that what we have in mind are, for
example, the various uses of the English 'reflexive' as illustrated in:
(i) The Queen herself said so
(ii) He cut the lawn himself
(iii) He flogged the Bishop himself
The effect in these cases may be glossed 'and not anyone else', 'not through the agency of
a third party', etc. The effect is thus to insist on the exact reference, to rebut a contrary
suggestion or a stereotypical presumption, etc. The scope of such particles can be complex,
as indicated by the ambiguity of the last example ('He himself flogged the Bishop' vs. 'The
Bishop himself was flogged by him'). For a useful exploration of the semantics/pragmatics
and scope of such particles, see Konig, 1991. He notes that a 'general phenomenon is
129 LIN 27
STEPHEN C. LEVINSON
emphatic use in (28a) of the 'reflexive' as in (28b), so for example in Tamil
we have the emphatic particle in (28 c) homophonous with the root of the
reflexive pronoun in (28 d).
(28) (a) The Prime Minister herself will come.
(b) She hit herself
(c) Ava-taan varuva
She-EMPH will come
(d) Ava taan-e aTicca
She self-ACC hit
The B-first account predicts this; on such a view, anaphors are just pronouns
marked in such a way that they will trigger an M-implicature to the
complement of the normal interpretation; if clausemates are normally
disjoint, a marked pronoun will M-implicate co-reference. The contrastive,
emphatic particle or affix will do the job nicely.28
the fact that scalar additive particles often take the same form as the so-called emphatic
reflexive pronouns or'intensifies': G. selbst, D. zelf, Norw. Seh, Fr. mime, lr. fein.' (MS,
233). Thus he relates scalar even to the emphatic uses of himself (cC. French meme, German
selbst cognate with English self)-both, to follow Edmondson & Plank (1978), 'associate
a pragmatic scale with propositions graduated in terms of the speaker's expectations of the
involvement of certain individuals in the relevant states, process and events' (MS, 235). See
also Kay, 1987.
[28] One difficulty with this line of explanation, Bite suggests, is raised by the Germanic
languages, which typically have two reflexive forms, cognate with German 'weak reflexive'
sich (associated with inherently reflexive verbs) and 'strong reflexive' sich selbsl. Contrary
to what one might expect given the argument, it is the weak reflexives that participate in
long distance binding and its associated logophoricity (see for instance Everaert, 1986:
212 f.; Hellan, 1988: 87 ff., 95; for this reason the morphologically unmarked 'weak'
reflexives are sometimes called, from a Binding perspective, 'marked'). On the other hand,
the strong reflexives have not had the same intensive study as the weak ones (Hellan, 1988:
87), so perhaps the facts are not so clear; for example, the strong reflexives in Dutch,
Norwegian and Icelandic also have long range uses if they are stressed (Everaert, 1986:
218 f.; 253 fn. 4; 254 fn. 12; Hellan, 1986: 104), an observation in line with the current
theory. But clearly the main factor here is the relative antiquity of the weak reflexive (from
proto-Indo-European *s(w)-, lost from West Germanic then reborrowed later in Dutch for
example), which may itself derive from an emphatic (see Section 4 below). The strong
reflexive form in all these languages seems to retain the pure emphatic functions (for
example as a modifier of a subject) and to be in the process of extending its functions in
the way predicted by the argument here. For some generalizations about 'weak'/'marked'
vs. 'strong'/'unmarked' reflexives, see Faltz, 1985; Yang, 1983. For an attempt to predict
their respective distributions see Pica, 1984, 1987; Everaert, 1986: ch. 8. Rizzi (1989) treats
the association of weak (morphologically simple) reflexives and long-range binding (and
conversely, compound reflexives and local binding) as so universally strong that it would
suffice for ' Degree-o learnability' - a child would not even need access to subordinate
clauses to know what the binding domain of a specific lexical Anaphor was! But Chinese
for example allows long reflexivization with both simple ziji and compound ta ziji (Y.
Huang, 1989: 96). The tendency for 'weak' (morphologically simpler) reflexives to have
long distance uses is attributed by Faltz (1985: 256 ff.) to their diachronic origins as
stressed pronouns in subordinate clauses, as with the African logophoric pronouns and
perhaps proto-Indo-European *s(w)-. If the association between 'weak' reflexives and
long-range uses does turn out to be a language-family wide generalization, there is a direct
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What is being offered here is, of course, a very simple, and no doubt in part
simplistic, explanation for the oft-noted overlap between reflexive and
emphatic forms. That overlap is sufficiently salient that there have been a
number of attempts to try and explain it. In the heyday of Generative
Semantics there were attempts for example to derive John himself came from
John, he came (Moyne, 1971) or John-John's own self-came (Cantrall,
1973). There have also been careful and interesting attempts to characterize
the exact semantic/pragmatic import of the intensifier use of reflexive forms.
Thus Moravcsik (1972) distinguished a 'head-bound' use (as in John himself
came) from an adverbial use {John came himself), and Edmondson and Plank
(1978) suggest the first has to do with a pragmatic scale (in the sense of
Fauconnier, 1975) of unexpectedness, the second with a scale of direct agency
or experience.29 Philosophers, too, have speculated on the meaning of
phrases like He himself. Hintikka (1970) for example claiming that the
intensifier rules out an intensional (or attributive) interpretation, Geach
(1972) that it translates a first person pronoun into a form appropriate for
indirect speech (see the discussion of logophoricity above). All of this is
usefully reviewed in Edmondson & Plank, 1978 and Konig, 1991, but
summarizing the semantico-pragmatic effects of the intensifier uses of
reflexive forms, we may note that (a) there is a contrastive, contrary-to-
expectation element; (b) there is a natural negative gloss, of the sort ' and not
anyone else', 'and not the more expectable persons'; (c) the intensifier often
plays a role in reference, by forcing a particular co-referential interpretation
of a pronoun ;30 (d) the intensifier could often be replaced with like effect by
stress; (e) issues of scope arise according to placement. All of these features
are compatible with, indeed explained by, an account in terms of M-
implicature and Horn's (1985) 'division of pragmatic labour' (that is to say,
in my terms, the complementarity of I-implicatures and M-implicatures). M-
potential explanation from our theory. The very fact that clausemate reflexivity is indicated
only by an emphatic form, which in long-range uses may be indicating merely a contrast
in perspective rather than reference, may motivate double-emphasis in the clausemate
cases. In fact there is direct diachronic evidence for this process in the origin of many
'strong' reflexive forms as double or triple emphatics: for example, Homeric Greek
reflexive he- (from Proto-Indo-European *s(w)-) was later fused with aulos (a form used
like English -self to form compound reflexives) to yield Classical heauton in the third
person, this in turn becoming Modern eaftos, now further modified with a possessive
pronoun indicating person, as in eafto tu, 'self his'. Proto-Romance *met-ipsimum is an
even clearer case of triple emphatic derivation - see footnote 47.
[29] Edmondson & Plank (1978: 386) in fact suggest that there is third himself in English which
indicates a reversal of semantic roles, as in Bill hit Sue and was himself hit by Ann.
[30] For example, after Edmondson & Plank, 1978: 380: 'John is a hippy. John's brother is a
banker, happily married with three children. He/He himself/HE is very much admired by
people of his own type.' The tendency is to take the unadorned pronoun to refer locally
to John's brother (as predicted by the I-principle), but a marked pronoun (with the
intensifier himself or intonational/stress prominence) suggests co-reference with John (by
' Horn's division of labour' whereby a marked form M-implicates the complement of the
I-implicature that would have arisen from the unmarked form).
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implicatures, by picking out the complementary interpretation to the
stereotypical I-based interpretation that would have been generated by the
use of a simple unmarked form, naturally give rise to contrary-to-stereotype,
negative interpretations. It is left open on this account that the contrast
intended may be either one of unexpectedness or point of view, on the one
hand, or one of reference, on the other.. That contrastive stress might do
exactly the same job is likewise explained - for all the intensification of the
NP is doing is warning of a marked interpretation. Finally, the fact that
issues of scope arise in no way demonstrates a codified semantic base for all
these meanings - for such issues also arise with classic implicatures, giving
rise to a complex projection problem for implicatures (Levinson, in prep., ch.
2). Thus simple though it is, the B-first account of the overlap between
reflexive pronouns and emphatic intensifiers modifying pronouns has much
to recommend it.
There is more general evidence for the use of marked forms to indicate
marked, reflexive, interpretations. In those languages, like many Australian
ones, where the reflexive is signalled by a special verb form, that verb form
is a marked form. In languages like Guugu Yimidhirr (Haviland, 1979;
Levinson, 1987a, b) this special verb-form does not directly encode
reflexivity, but only indicates directly that one argument is missing. There is
a pragmatic inference in many cases to the reflexive. But this can be further
reinforced by the use of an emphatic affix which then makes the reflexive or
reciprocal reading central:
(29) bama-gu gunda-dhi
the people (ABS)-EMPH hit-ANTiPASSiVE
'the people hit each other'
or ' the people hit themselves'
or 'someone hit the people'
Thus in languages which currently lack, but which seem to be in the process
of acquiring, fully grammaticalized, unequivocal anaphors, we can find the
same association between markedness and reflexive readings.
A third closely related kind of evidence for the B-first account is the
diachronic fact that reflexives seem in many cases to have derived from
emphatic or contrastive forms, even if there is no longer a homophonous
corresponding emphatic particle or affix. Such appears to be the case with
Tamil taan, or Chinese, ziji, for example, and I will discuss the history of
English reflexives below in detail. However, the most persuasive kind of
evidence for the B-first analysis comes from consideration of languages that
lack Anaphors altogether. As we've noted, such languages obviously cannot
support an A-first analysis. It is therefore crucial to see what patterns of
anaphora they exhibit.
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3.1. Languages without reflexives
There are scattered reports from around the world of languages that do not
directly code reflexivity. Such languages seem to have been largely ignored by
grammatical theorists even though they would appear to be crucial evidence
against the centrality of the Binding apparatus.31 It is not yet clear just how
common the absence of reflexives is. Faltz (1977: 210 f.) cites the Low West
Germanic sub-group of languages (including Old English) and Biblical
Hebrew; Carden and Stewart (1986: 51) cite Fijian and other Austronesian
languages,32 a non-Austronesian New Guinea language Haruai (data from
Comrie), and about half the pidgins and Creoles (in many cases by
independent innovation). We can add many Australian languages, and there
are no doubt other groups of languages yet to be reported. In this section I
provide a sketch of the facts for some of these cases to aid and abet the
rehabilitation of these linguistic orphans.
3.1.1. Australian languages. We have already seen that there are languages,
like Guugu Yimidhirr, which lack true reflexives. In fact, the majority of
Australian languages would seem to lack Anaphors. Instead, in many of
these languages the reflexive meaning is indicated by a semantically general
anti-passive or detransitivized clause (Dixon, 1980: 448). The anti-passive
construction can be thought of as transforming a transitive clause into an
intransitive one with a single Absolutive argument; it thus simply indicates
that, for one reason or another, one of the arguments of the verb is missing,
unknown or irrelevant. The reflexive meaning is just one natural in-
terpretation of the anti-passive; but as we noted for Guugu Yimidhirr, the
reflexive interpretation can be forced by an emphatic affix on the sole
argument (as we would expect on the B-first account, which derives reflexives
from marked pronouns, or more generally, marked reflexive clauses from
unmarked non-reflexive ones). In some languages, though, the use of such an
intransitive form to express 'reflexive meaning' is optional. For example
Dixon (1983: 497) reports on Nyawaygi, where the reflexive can be expressed
by an anti-passive, a regular transitive with two ordinary NPs (one in the
[31] An anonymous referee comments that the existence of languages without Anaphors is no
more embarrassing to GB than the existence of languages without nasal consonants,
although it might be interesting to see whether such languages invariably fail to have NP
movement processes, as GB-theory might predict. Such a correlation is almost certainly
missing; for example, one can find passives in most of the languages under consideration.
There is in fact one detailed GB-style analysis of a B-first language which has come to my
attention late in the preparation of this paper. Chung (1989) describes Chamorro as
without surface Anaphors but with canonical NP-traces in Raising and Passive
constructions. Chung in fact is driven to the reluctant conclusion that Chomsky's parallel
between movement and bound-anaphora may have to be abandoned. See the discussion
below.
[32] See for example Tryon (1970: 97) on Tahitian.
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Ergative and the other in the Absolutive case), or a transitive verb with two
NPs in the Absolutive case. In other languages one simply has two NPs in the
Absolutive with a normal transitive verb, as if they were both the subjects
(one the head, the other a modifying adjunct) of an intransitive verb. Again,
this seems to be optional; in Wargamay one can express ' I've cut my foot'
in two ways (Dixon, 1981: 64-65):
(30) (a) ngayba bingany gunbay
ISG-S f00t-ABS CUt-UNMKD
'I-foot cut'
(b) ngaDa gunbay bingany ngaygu
ISG-A CUt-UNMKD foot-ABS ISG-GEN
' I cut my foot.'
And recollect the Guugu Yimidhirr facts above. There is no unequivocal
reflexive or reciprocal construction. To indicate reflexivity one uses a de-
transitivizing verbal affix, thus suggesting the irrelevance of the missing
argument. That irrelevance may stem from the speaker's not knowing who
or what the agent was, or from the accidental nature of the agency (for
instance, the wind blowing something over), or from the fact that the missing
argument is identical to the surviving one. However, the reflexive reading can
be made prominent by marking the surviving NP with the emphatic particle
- :gu as we noted. The same use of the emphatic attached to a pronoun can
suggest co-referentiality where the anti-passive construction cannot be used,
as in a sentence with the meaning 'Johnj helped WSJ-EMPHATIC father'. Here
we see an emphatic reflexive in the very making.
However, some of these languages do not employ any such device at all.
For example, in Gumbaynggir (New South Wales) the reflexive is expressed
by a normal transitive sentence (Eades, 1979: 312):
(31) gua:du bu:rwang gula:na magayu
3SG-ERG paint-PAST 3SG-ABS red paint-iNST
Hex painted him1/2 with red paint
' He painted himself/him with red paint.'
There would appear to be a suffix -w (gula.naw instead ofgula.na above) that
forces a reflexive reading, but this is definitely optional (p. 313). Similarly,
Peter Austin (1987) reports that Jiwarli does not formally express any
distinction between an ordinary transitive sentence and a reflexive meaning:
'Jiwarli reflexives are indistinguishable from simple transitive clauses except
that the subject and object nominals are co-referential', thus:
(32) Nhurra-lu puthirninyja nhurra-nha
You-ERG hit-PAST you-ACC
'You hit you' (= 'You hit yourself)
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3.1.2. Austronesian: Fijian. A number of Austronesian languages are
reported to lack reflexives and reciprocals, but Fijian is perhaps the best
documented. InDixon's (1988: 255-256) grammar we find that 'For first and
second persons the reflexive is simply shown by using the appropriate
pronoun in both subject and object slots'; or, if it is an indirect object that
is involved, the ordinary pronoun in the relevant case is used. In the third
person, a verb with the transitive marker -a and without an explicit object
will be interpreted as having 'unmarked reference to a 3sg object' which is
non-co-referential with the subject. If co-reference or reflexivity is intended,
a full object pronoun (e.g. 'ea, 3Sg Object) is required, and although this
might be interpreted disjointly, it encourages a co-referential reading:
(33) sa va'a-.dodonu-.ta'ini 'ea o Mika
ASP correct 3SG-0BJ ART
' Mike corrected himself or
' Mike corrected him'
The pattern looks like our hypothesized B-first type: the least marked form
of a transitive clause encourages the supposition that the arguments are
distinct in reference; any marked form raises some possible doubt about this,
and so is the normal way to express co-reference if intended. Apparently the
same holds for the expression of the reciprocal relationship, although there
are also intransitive roots and so on that can also be used to express this.33
An Austronesian language that has been the subject of some detailed GB
work is Chamorro (Chung, 1989). Chung notes (1989: 148 ff.) that Anaphors
and Pronominals are morphologically identical just as in Fijian, although the
reflexive interpretation can be forced by an optional adverb maisa (glossed
as 'by oneself). However, she goes on to argue that two grammatical
constraints are sensitive to the coindexing of NPs within minimal governing
categories, and therefore that Chamorro quasi-pronominals are in effect
ambiguous ('morphologically syncretic'), distinguished into Anaphors and
Pronominals at the syntactic level. A peculiar consequence, however, of
taking these constraints to be syntactic criteria for covert Anaphors is that the
same criteria then identify NP-trace and PRO as non-Anaphors (173 ff.). It
seems to me then that it may be preferable to treat the special constraints on
Chamorro pronominals construed reflexively as semantic. For example,
there seems to be a syntactic filter banning any third-person plural subject of
a normal transitive clause, UNLESS subject and object are co-referential. But
[33] Another Austronesian language, Tahitian, apparently follows the same sort of pattern
(Tryon, 1970: 97). To express the reflexive one can only use the pronoun:
(i) 'ua ha'opohe 'oia 'iana
was kill he him
'He killed himself
But there is an emphatic affix iho, which when added to the pronoun seems to be the
standard way to express at least the reciprocal meaning.
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the exception is surely based on the natural semantic conception of reflexive
clauses as quasi-intransitive, as shown in the world-wide association of
middle verb-forms with reflexivity both synchronically and diachronically
(see Genuisiene, 1987). The second constraint likewise gives no real support
to a syntactic distinction between Anaphor and Pronominal. In any case,
Chamorro is clearly a language where a single range of pronominals does
double duty as a set of reflexive and non-reflexive pronouns, as seems often
to be the case in the Austronesian family.34
3.1.3. Creoles}6 A third and diverse group of languages that seem generally
to lack Anaphors are the pidgins and Creoles of all origins. These languages
have recently been surveyed by Carden and Stewart (1986, 1987, 1988) to see
to what extent the Binding Conditions adequately describe their anaphoric
patterns. They point out that the issue is rather interesting from the point of
view of the 'bio-program' hypothesis advanced by Bickerton (1981). If the
Binding Conditions are innate, and if pidgins upon creolizing should reveal
the essential stripped-down properties of human language, then we might
expect to find the Binding Conditions rapidly instantiated upon creolization.
This is not however at all what was found in the survey. Instead, the evidence
seems to show both that pidgins and Creoles tend to lack Anaphors, and that
they tend to lack a grammaticalized Binding Condition B (pronouns
obligatorily disjoint with clausemate antecedents). I repeat a selection of
their findings.
Carden and Stewart (1986: 13 f.) report that in the Northern dialect of
Haitian creole the ordinary pronouns may be used as reflexives:
(34) (a) Emile dwe ede li
Emile should help him
(Emile can be co-referential with li)
(b) Emile dwe ede tet-a-li (or ko-a-li)
Emile should help himself
(Emile and tet-a-li must be co-referential)
[34] The other syntactic reflex of the supposed Anaphors in Chamorro is a 'subject effect'
whereby co-reference is exceptionally ruled out where an antecedent precedes a pronominal
subject (in general Chamorro seems to allow co-reference wherever an antecedent precedes
or c-commands a pronominal). Since Chamorro pronominals are ambiguous on Chung's
account, between Anaphors and Pronominals, it is not clear how such co-reference could
be ruled out: an Anaphor and Pronominal in complementary distribution might be
expected to cover all possibilities. Chung (1989: 162-164) therefore argues that this
disjointness is due to a pragmatic opposition of the kind used by Reinhart (1983) or in our
Q-based account of A-first languages, preferring the use of the Anaphor (with a passive or
active transform if necessary). If on the other hand no such distinction between Anaphors
and Pronominals exists in Chamorro, then the constraint (syntactic, semantic or pragmatic)
can be simply and directly expressed (whatever exactly its motivation).
[35] I am most grateful to David Perlmutter for putting me in touch with this work on Creoles,
not to mention useful discussions with him, conducted partly on the jog.
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They note that the literal meanings of tet (' head') and kd (' body') play a role
in the choice between these reflexive forms and that tet is used as an emphatic
focusing particle as in tet-Emile ('it was Emile himself). They conclude from
this that the Northern dialect of the Creole can be treated as an earlier, less
grammaticalized stage of the Creole. Historical data seem to support this: the
earliest materials provide plenty of evidence for the use of the plain pronouns
as reflexives but little or no evidence for the specialized reflexive forms (1986:
20). The implication is that the earliest forms of the Creole had no reflexives;
the later reflexives based on body-part metaphors may be due either to
ultimate (African) substrate sources or, just as likely, to independent
invention. Other Creoles also exhibit no reflexive forms, as for example the
Spanish-based Palenquero (1986: 24), and perhaps half of all Creole lects
allow the reflexive use of clausemate pronouns (Carden & Stewart, 1986:
footnote 58; 1987: 23 ff. - examples include Martinique Creole, Chinook
Jargon, Bislama, KiNubi and Negerhollands). Corne (1988) shows that
Mauritian Creole uses the ordinary pronouns as reflexives in the unmarked
case, even though it has reflexive forms. (Although Corne believes this use of
pronouns to be a post-creole innovation, Carden and Stewart (1989) re-
analyze the historical material to argue that this use of the pronouns is
derived from the original pidginization process.)
Comparison leads Carden and Stewart to hypothesize a diachronic
sequence in Creole languages (I here generalize from their discussion of
Haitian Creole, p. 26, in line with their footnote 58):
(i) STAGE 1: no encoded reflexives; plain pronouns used reflexively.
(ii) STAGE 2: gradual emergence of morphological reflexives (based for
example on body-part metaphors) with a clause-mate, subject-
antecedent condition, co-existing with but encroaching upon the use
of ordinary pronouns as reflexives.
(iii) STAGE 3: the loss of the reflexive use of the ordinary pronouns.
One point that they draw special attention to is that the tolerant treatment
of pronouns as possible reflexives is not a feature that is by any means lost
abruptly (surviving some hundreds of years in some dialects of the Haitian
Creole), as might be expected if Principle B were part of the bioprogram that
would assert itself immediately upon the acquisition of native speakers, in
other words upon creolization of the original pidgin. The gradual nature of
the change towards a typologically unmarked system (with reflexives and
Principle B) argues either against Bickerton's idea that creolization should
reveal the bioprogram in the raw as it were, or against the idea that the
Binding Principles are core elements of that bioprogram. They also draw
attention to the parallels in language acquisition. Studies by Solan (1987),
Jakubowicz (1984) and others show that while the clausemate restriction on
the interpretation of reflexives (in languages that have them) is acquired
early, the Principle B non-reflexive use of pronouns is much more uncertainly
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acquired, with sometimes as many as 50 % of four to six-year-olds finding a
clausemate co-reference between an NP and a non-reflexive pronoun
possible (Solan, 1987). As Carden and Stewart point out this finding is
surprising in the light of the apparent rareness of languages that permit the
reflexive use of ordinary clausemate pronouns.
In any case, the conclusion I wish to draw from the Creole studies is that
there is definite evidence in favour of a B-first analysis in such languages,
both synchronically in that many Creoles just use a marked or emphatic
pronoun to indicate a reflexive, and diachronically in that Creoles which do
seem to have Anaphors also seem to have passed through a B-first stage with
no Anaphors.
3.1.4. Old English. As the diachronic sequence hypothesized for Creoles
makes clear, a B-first analysis clearly projects a diachronic sequence:
Anaphors should develop out of marked pronouns which are used to M-
implicate conjointness in opposition to the I-based presumption of disjoint
clause-mates. In that case, an A-flrst language, at least one that codes
reflexivity through reflexive pronouns, should develop out of a B-first
language (at least that should be one likely source). English is then an
interesting test case, because it was clearly at one stage, the earliest stage of
Old English, a B-first language without encoded Anaphors.
According to Visser's (1963. Vol. 1: 420-439) compendious treatment of
Old English, self was not originally a reflexive element: ' in the earliest Old
English texts self could be added to the personal pronouns in the nominative
whenever this was thought necessary for the sake of emphasis... It seems
however to have taken some time before self was added to the reflexive
pronouns [i.e. ordinary pronouns used reflexively - SCL]... that already from
the beginning of the Old English period were widely used as objects without
the addition of self (ibid. 420). Thus, self clearly began as an emphatic
adjectival adjunct to nominative pronouns 'with the purpose of emphasizing
the identity of the person or thing denoted by the object and the subject'
(ibid. 425), and at the time of Beowulf a reflexive object could only be
expressed by the normal accusative pronouns, as in ic me clcensie ' I washed
me'.36 By the time of King Alfred both that mode of expression and its
counterpart with self (as in ic me selfne clansie) seem to have been
current: thus both hieforseod hie selfe and hieforseod hie (ibid. 421). Indeed
the use of the simple pronoun as a reflexive continued right through the
Middle English period, although during that period (say 1200-1500) 'there
is a distinct change in the relative frequency of the two forms: the simple
[36] Mitchell (1985: 189) concurs with Visser's observation that 'emphatic self is found in the
earliest texts in the nominative...its use with an accusative reflexive pronoun appears to
come later. It is not found in Beowulf, Genesis, Exodus, Christ and Satan, Deor or even
Juliana, although it is evident in the prose of King Alfred's time'.
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pronouns, which in the beginning are numerically predominant, are
gradually, and to an ever increasing extent, encroached upon by the
compound pronouns (= pronouns + self), with the result that by the second
half of the fifteenth century they are more or less in the minority in most
writings' (ibid. 432). Throughout this period then 'such a phrase as he
ofsticode hine might mean either "he stabbed him" (someone else) or "he
stabbed himself" (Visser, p. 433 citing Sweet). Visser suggests that the
emphatic was increasingly used to avoid such possible ambiguities.37
It is tempting, of course, for modern commentators to make a sharp
distinction between the emphatic and reflexive uses of self, 'but to import it
into OE is to follow a false native informant. As I see it Quirk and Wrenn
are on the right track when they say... "For the most part, self was used in
OE simply to emphasize and was not, as in Mod. E., associated with being
a reflexive sign or a pronoun-enclitic"' (Mitchell, 1985: 189). The essential
fact about Old English is that both the plain pronoun, hine, and the corres-
ponding emphatic pronoun, hine selfne, could be used either reflexively or
non-reflexively in, for example, object position (Mitchell, 1985: 115).38 Thus
the reflexive uses indubitably grew out of the emphatic uses, and not the other
way around. Faltz (1985: 242) notes a further piece of evidence for the
evolution of reflexives from the use of emphatics to mark non-stereotypical
interpretations. The hypothesis suggests that where a reflexive interpretation
might in fact be stereotypical, as with predicates like 'wash' and 'dress', the
emphatic pronouns would not in fact be used. And this seems to have been
the case in Middle English: one said he cladde hym as a poure laborer rather
than cladde hym self. The history of English thus seems to provide excellent
evidence for an evolution of reflexives out of emphatics. The point at which
the emphatic became grammaticalized as a reflexive can perhaps be equated
with the point at which it lost its inflection, at the transition of Old to Middle
English. But as just indicated, this long preceded the acquisition of Binding
B-like patterns outlawing the reflexive use of ordinary pronouns, which
survived well into Shakespeare and beyond (Visser, 1963: 435).39
[37] Visser (1963: 439 ff.) documents the same 'ambiguity' with the reciprocal meaning: hi
gecyslon hi could mean either 'they kissed them' or 'they kissed each other', this usage
surviving into Middle English, but being supplanted by various means of reciprocal
marking, such as adverbs with this sense of'mutually', and the each... other forms already
utilized in Old English.
[38) Mitchell (1985: 115) gives the following kind of example of the non-reflexive use of the
form hine selfne:
(i) Moyses, se de was Gode sua weord dat he oft wid hine selfne sprac (from King
Alfred's West Saxon version of Gregory's Pastoral Care 131.11)
On this example, see the discussion following (42) below.
[39] One additional element in this history that the historians of the language dwell on is the
following progression: ic me clansie > ic me selfne clansie > ic clansie; that is, the loss of
the reflexive object with verbs like wash, dress, shave, etc (see Jespersen, 1927: 325 f.; Visser,
1963: 145 ff.). The correlation of the omission with the stereotypical reading (as predicted
by the I-principle) is of course striking.
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However, regardless of the diachronic progression, there is little doubt that
Old English was a classical B-first language, at least in the earliest period: it
lacked Anaphors entirely, operating with a presumption of clausemate NP
disjointness, a presumption that could be defeated by the use of a pronoun
with an emphatic adjunct. The history of Dutch (and no doubt other West
Germanic languages) might have been similar had it not been for the
relatively recent influence of German: before then just as in Old English there
were no reflexives, pronouns doing double duty.40 But, according to Everaert
(1986: 3), 'in the 14th and 15th centuries the eastern dialects of the Dutch
language area started to use a s/c/j-reflexive (which later developed into zich)
under the influence of Middle Low German dialects involved in a process of
sich adoption from Middle High German. If we look at the present-day non-
standard dialects we can observe that the use of zich is still limited to the
eastern dialects (Ureland, 1981)'. Everaert notes that West Flemish (1986:
43) and Afrikaans (1986: 39-40) continue to operate without morphological
reflexives.41
There is no doubt, then, that there are languages without Anaphors or
reflexives of any kind. The most interesting thing about such languages from
the current point of view is that THE OPPOSITION BETWEEN CO-REFERENCE AND
DISJOINT REFERENCE IN SUCH LANGUAGES CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED PRAG-
MATICALLY ; it can only be suggested, indeed implicated, by the choice of a
specific kind of referring expression. If there are general pragmatic processes
that can be reliably employed to make such referential distinctions in such
languages (and there must be), then there is every reason to think that the
same pragmatic processes operate in other languages to support partially
grammaticalized oppositions of the same kind. Thus the very existence of
languages of this sort is evidence in favour of the fundamental role that we
are attributing to generalized conversational implicature in the interpretation
of anaphora.
3.2. Interim conclusions: the B-first account
There is, then, distinct evidence in favour of a B-first analysis. First, as we
have seen, there is evidence that there are languages that have no way of
coding reflexivity at all. This makes an A-first analysis impossible of course;
for the A-first analysis predicts all the patterns of anaphora as pragmatically
derived from a grammatical core - something like Principle A of the Binding
Conditions. It goes without saying that such B-first languages are even more
serious challenges to the Chomskyan account (where Principle A is claimed
[40] Thus, according to grammars of the seventeenth and eighteenth century, a sentence like Hij
beschuldight hem ('He accuses him/himself) was ambiguous. See Everaert, 1986: 3 ff. and
references therein.
[41] A reflexive based on an emphatic, as in hem zelf, is also still current in standard Dutch, see
Koster, 1986: 344 f.
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to have no basis in experience and is held to govern NP-movement as well as
Anaphor construal). We can then ask whether in languages with an ill-
developed or zero coding of refiexivity, we can nevertheless find a
grammaticalized Principle B. But the question suggests its own answer - if
core-arguments of transitive verbs are necessarily disjoint, how could
refiexivity be expressed at all in languages where there is no direct coding of
it? So in such languages the assumption of disjoint clausemate arguments can
only be a tendency: in short a pragmatic inference to the stereotype. What
we do see in such languages is the acquisition of some device to suggest the
non-stereotypical co-referential interpretation; the theory of Generalized
Conversational Implicatures (GCI) predicts that such a device would be
merely a matter of marking the NP or the verb as describing a marked
situation, thereby M-implicating conjoint reference against an I-based
assumption of disjoint clausemates. Thus we obtain Principle A-like patterns
of interpretation of marked pronouns as a pragmatic inference from a pre-
established B-like pattern.
A B-first analysis therefore requires that Principle B-like patterns of
interpretation cannot have a deep grammatical basis. Yet there is an intuition
that the inference to disjoint reference in, say, John hit him is overwhelmingly
strong. But of course the inference may only be that robust in the familiar
languages blessed with Anaphors, where on an A-first account the inference
is engendered (or reinforced) by a Q-contrast with the reflexive; and even
there it may not be that strong (see the discussion under the rubric of
defeasibility in Levinson, 1987 b). Further evidence for the relative weakness
of B-like patterns comes from studies of child language acquisition. As
mentioned, these studies (conducted on A-first languages like English) seem
to show that children learning A-first languages learn the clausemate
restriction on reflexives relatively early (as early as three) and relatively
exceptionlessly (up to 95%); but the assumption that a non-reflexive
pronoun in object position is disjoint from the clausemate subject is learned
relatively late (as late as five or six) and applied only some of the time (in
some experimental conditions as little as 36%-see Solan, 1987; also
Jakubowicz, 1984, Read & Hare, 1979). All this fits the A-first analysis,
which would make the Condition B-like patterns of interpretation a matter
of Q-implicature. But it also indicates that Principle B is not as natural and
robust as it seems to the intuitions of adult speakers of A-first languages.
We seem to be left then with the possibility that there are two rather
radically different kinds of languages: those that have a grammaticalized
Principle A (or similar), and those that lack it, but have a pragmatically
based Principle B-like assumption that clausemate arguments are distinct
unless otherwise indicated. The A-first languages are numerically in the
ascendant, and there is historical evidence that the B-first languages tend to
develop into A-first systems. In both cases, though, our theory of GCIs gives
some account of how the rest of the anaphora patterns can be derived.
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4. SYNTHESIS OF A-FIRST & B-FIRST ACCOUNTS
Let us sum up so far. We have reviewed the earlier A-first account of binding
patterns, which makes the anaphoric patterns attributed by GB theorists to
principles B and C of the Binding Conditions pragmatically derivative from
grammaticalized Anaphors. We have shown how certain difficulties with this
may be circumvented; and in particular we have shown that the most
prominent problem, the overlap in distribution between (especially long-
range) reflexives and pronouns, is not necessarily an overwhelming difficulty
at all. Instead, by bringing the subtle 'logophoric' aspects of long-distance
reflexives into the picture, we can maintain the Q-based contrast between
pronoun and reflexive. Thus we end up with a natural extension of the A-first
account into languages and phenomena (like switch-reference) beyond those
for which it was originally developed. We can now say that there is a large
class of languages (those we have been calling the A-first languages) that
seem to fall within the scope of such a pragmatic reduction of the Binding
Conditions.
One problem remains with the A-first account, sufficient to suggest that we
are still missing an essential ingredient, namely the fact that the reflexive and
the pronoun seem to be in a different kind of opposition when there is a
potential antecedent within the clause compared to when the potential
antecedent is outside the clause. In the first case, the opposition is nearly
always one of reference; in the second case it is either one of reference or one
of 'logophoricity', and hence the pronoun can often occur with the same
reference. The different kinds of contrast that obtain in a language such as
Chinese are represented schematically in (35):
(35) (a) Johnj hit selfj [±logophoric]
(b) John! hit him2 f strongly disjoint]
[± logophoric J
(c) Johnj says that selfj will come [+logophoric]
(d) Johnx says that he1/2 will come [weakly disjoint]
[ — logophoric J
On the face of it, this fact in many languages with long-range reflexives
predisposes us once again to a grammatical account, taking the reflexive and
the pronoun to have different binding domains. However, once the wider
facts about distribution of the reflexive are considered (like the fact that the
antecedent can be far removed, even beyond the sentence, or deictically
implicit), the grammatical account no longer looks tenable. The basic fact - a
semantic fact - is that the reflexive is necessarily referentially dependent, the
pronoun only optionally so; the search for an antecedent seems to be guided
by matters of preferential interpretation, not grammatical principles (for an
extended justification of this for Chinese, see Y. Huang, 1989). Besides, a
grammatical account would leave the logophoric contrasts unaccounted for.
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If we bring our B-first analysis back into the consideration of our A-first
languages, we can now find an answer to this rather central puzzle. Suppose
we assume that in A-first languages we can find the same presumption that
is central to the anaphoric operations of B-first languages, namely the
presumption that core arguments of a single clause are disjoint. In addition,
of course, we have the Q-implicated contrast between reflexive and pronoun,
which in a language without long-distance reflexives is sufficient explanation
for the tendency to read the pronoun as disjoint with a clausemate
antecedent. It follows that in languages without long-distance reflexives, the
presumption that core arguments are disjoint is redundant, which is why it
never figured in our original A-first account. On the other hand, in
languages with long-distance reflexives, although the two pragmatic
principles will be largely overlapping and reinforcing, in the case of the long-
distance use of the reflexive we will have a Q-contrast outside the scope of the
clausemate-disjointness presumption. In those long-distance locations, the
Q-contrast need not be interpreted as a contrast in reference (although it may
be); it may instead be interpreted as a contrast in logophoricity, along the
lines that O'Connor suggests.
To summarize the argument, then, we have two pragmatic principles at
work:
(a) the presumption of clausemate core-argument disjointness, a stereo-
typical presumption that can be attributed to the I-principle;
(b) a scalar Q-implicature contrast between reflexive and pronoun, based
on the differential semantic strength of the reflexive and the pronoun,
the one being necessarily referentially dependent, the other only
optionally so; the one suggesting emphasis and involvement, the other
lacking such suggestions.
Where the two presumptions overlap, that is where antecedent and anaphoric
items are core-argument clausemates, the first pragmatic presumption will
ensure there is always a contrast in reference. The contrast in reference will
be sufficient motivation for the choice between reflexive and pronoun, thus
exhausting the pragmatic import. Outside these positions, a long-range
reflexive is contrastive, but not necessarily contrastive in reference. Such a
synchronic account goes some of the way towards answering our central
puzzle, but it still leaves aspects of the puzzle unexplained. In particular, it
is still not clear why the reflexive in long-range positions should have a
logophoric interpretation that is not available in the clausemate use. Where
does the deictic markedness come from?
The problem is only fully resolved, I believe, by taking a diachronic
perspective, by looking at the anaphoric patterns that languages exhibit as
accretions of pragmatic practices. We have already seen, in the review of the
facts about creole languages, and more especially in the detailed facts about
the history of Old English, some reason to believe that B-first systems evolve
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into A-first systems. I would now like to propose that this is the general
evolutionary route by which the familiar A-first languages have arisen.
Restricting ourselves to the languages that mark reflexivity by NP-type, on
such a diachronic account, Anaphors arise as marked pronominal NPs M-
implicating contrast with the clausemate-disjointness presumption. But the
use in a B-first language, as so often, of emphatics to encode the marking, is
obviously consistent with a much wider use of such forms. In particular, since
a deictic perspective is the perennial unmarked presumption, a marked or
emphatic form may always suggest a contrastive perspective, one for instance
where, as Stirling, 1988, puts it, the 'validator' is not the current speaker (see
also Levinson, 1988). Here we have the explanation of the association of
' logophoricity' with reflexives: both conjoint reference within the clause and
a marked (non-)deictic perspective are perennial possibilities of interpretation
of the use of a marked form in a B-first language, which will suggest by M-
implicature an interpretation complementary to the stereotypical one that
would arise from the use of the corresponding unmarked form.
Putting these ingredients together, we may schematize the 'evolution' of
reflexives and thus the diachronic progression from B-first languages to A-
first ones as follows:42
Stage 1: NO REFLEXIVES ; CORE-ARGUMENTS TEND TO BE DISJOINT
'John hit him' will I-implicate the stereotype 'core arguments are distinct
in reference'; only ad hoc means such as the use of an emphatic to M-
implicate the complementary interpretation can be used to indicate co-
reference; the same means are likely to be used to M-implicate a marked
deictic perspective.
Stage 2: EMPHATIC CORE-ARGUMENTS MAY BE CONJOINT
The co-referential interpretation of 'John hit him' is now regularly
reinforced by the use of a focus or 'emphatic' particle: 'John hit him-
EMPH' M + > 'John hit himself. An established usage of this sort
reinforces: 'John hit him' 1+ > 'Johnx hit him2'. But since the marking
of pronouns is by a focus particle with general uses, other contrasts
(beyond reference) may be intended; one such contrast being the point of
view contrast called 'logophoric': 'John said he will come' expresses the
[42] The evolution in the other direction, by the loss of Anaphors, is not of course
inconceivable; indeed this seems to be what exceptionally happened in the West Germanic
languages which are presumed to have lost the reconstructed Proto-Germanic reflexive *sik
(see below). But the diachronic processes here would be of a quite different kind, Nigel
Vincent points out to me, perhaps due to phonetic change or language contact. The
bidirectional possibilities should not be confused with some natural cycle; for example,
Vincent (1989 b) insists, the apparent synthesis-analysis-synthesis cycle in some Romance
verbal inflections disguises quite different underlying mechanisms. The historical change of
B-first to A-first systems would seem in accord with the kind of grammaticalization of
analytic into synthetic grammatical systems.
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unmarked deictic point of view, while 'John said he-EMPH will come'
M + > marked point of view.
Stage 3: EMPHATICS BECOME REFLEXIVES (A-first system)
An established system emerges: grammaticalized reflexives encoding
necessary referential dependence within some domain. So now:
(a) co-core-argument positions: 'John hit him' is not only presumed
disjoint by I, uncancelled by any M-implicature, but also Q-implicates
disjoint reference by the scale <Anaphor, Pronoun). Hence there is the
strong inference to disjoint core-arguments from the use of a pronoun.
(b) where antecedent and anaphor are not clause-mate core-arguments:
here the I-inference to disjointedness does not obtain. There is still a
Q-contrast, but now a contrast in reference is not the only possible
one, for the marked Anaphor may still carry the 'marked point of




The consequence is that use of the Pronoun Q-implicates that the
speaker is not in a position to use the Anaphor because either he
intends disjoint reference or he intends non-logophoricity.
So far, for this hypothetical diachronic progression we have adduced
evidence only from Old English and the various mentioned Creoles, but it
seems to be largely, if not entirely, compatible with the diachronic hypotheses
about the origins of reflexives advanced by Faltz (1985) on the basis of the
few major recent typological reviews of reflexivity encoding.43 His findings
are worth reviewing in detail. Faltz suggests (1985: 48 ff.) that the main
typological distinction is between languages that have true, underived,
pronominal reflexives (like Russian sebja and German sich44) and those with
compound reflexives. Compound reflexives are of different types:
(i) nominal head reflexives, usually modified by a possessive pronoun, as
in Turkish kendi-me 'self-mine';45
(ii) adjunct reflexives, based on a pronoun modified with a reflexive
adjunct as in Old English hine-sylfne ' 3MSG-ACC + REFL ' or Irish e fein
'him + REFL';
[43] There are a great number of more specialized works, for example on reflexive verbs. See
Geniusiene, 1987 for references.
[44] From Proto-European *s(w)-, proto-Germanic *sik, a form lost in the development of
English (Faltz, 1985: 210).
[45] This leaves reflexives like Japanese zibun, a nominal head without modifier, somewhat
stranded; Faltz (1985: 49) suggests that they must either be assimilated to the true
pronominal reflexives or analyzed as head + zero modifier.
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(iii) fused adjunct reflexives, like modern English where himself can no
longer be analyzed simply as head + modifier.
In addition to all these types, we have verbal reflexivizers, often derived
from cliticized pronominal or nominal reflexives (like French se + verb from







Certain properties are said to be restricted to each of these types. For
example, P reflexives require subject antecedents, strictly require all co-
referential clause-mates to be encoded with the P form, but may have long-
distance uses, while C reflexives tend to allow non-subject antecedents, allow
some oblique non-reflexive co-referential clausemates, but do not permit
'long-range' uses. (It is clear in fact on the basis of more recent information
that these could be at most systematic trends.)
Faltz (1985: ch. 6) then suggests that the following kinds of diachronic
progressions may be hypothesized:
(i) All verbal reflexives come from NP reflexives via cliticization, thus:
P > V or C > V together with an associated tendency for later semantic
bleaching of the reflexive verb form to a ' middle' (or generalized intrans-
itivizing) verb-form; reverse progressions do not occur,46 and it is
hypothesized that there are no progressions P > C or C > P (Faltz 1985:
233 fT.).
(ii) Perhaps all C reflexives come from emphatic adjuncts on pronouns, as
for instance Old English self, French mime (from late Latin *met-ipsimumi'!),
[46] Faltz rejects (fn 6, p. 278) the idea that intransitivizing verbal affixes might specialize to
become reflexives. Actually, though, this seems to be happening in the case of Guugu
Yimidhirr anti-passive or middle (see Haviland, 1979; Levinson, 1987b), with reflexive
specialization of the intransitivized verb being currently marked by an additional emphatic
on the single NP. Of course, the Guugu Yimidhirr anti-passive might already have passed
through a reflexive stage, with subsequent semantic bleaching, but some evidence against
this is that some verbs (see Haviland, 1979: 126 f.) that obligatorily take anti-passive
inflection (by some frozen, and thus presumably old, process) simply have an intransitive
meaning (e.g. 'explode', 'shine', etc.).
[47] Nigel Vincent tells me that the Proto-Romance formation *met-ipsimum is a case of
threefold emphasis: met was an emphatic (as in egomet ' I myself), ipse was the standard
Latin emphatic pronoun with case inflection, and -imum was the superlative suffix as found
in maximum, etc. He adds that Italian stesso derives from iste-ipse, a double pronoun
combination.
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Dutch zelf, Papago hijil, etc. (1985: 243 ff.); some of those based on forms
glossing like 'his head/body' also clearly derive from emphatics (Biblical
Hebrew), while others may possibly have been directly coined to encode
reflexivization.
(iii) More speculatively, P pronouns derive from 'subordinate reflexives'
(long-range-only reflexives). These are non-reflexive pronouns used co-
referentially with non-clause-mate antecedents, like the logophoric African
pronouns discussed above.48 These 'subordinate reflexives' in turn derive
either from stressed pronouns or from a first-person pronoun used in direct
reported speech.49
Thus, if in broad outline Faltz is right, nearly all reflexives ultimately arise
from emphatic or stressed pronouns.50 As to why this might be the case, he
advances what is in effect a brief and informal version of our B-first account:
' an emphatic is added to an NP as a warning to the hearer that the intended
referent of that NP is unusual or unexpected' (1985: 240); 'in the absence of
a reflexive strategy, it is natural for an emphatic to be used to signal that the
more highly marked, less expected situation is present, namely that the NP
(argument) in question has the same referent as another one in the same
predication' {ibid. 242). In addition to Old English, Faltz cites Dutch, French
and Spanish secondary reflexives {meme and mismo), Papago, Hebrew, and
the like as providing clear evidence for reflexives derived from emphatics.51
The German secondary reflexive selbst is also interesting here; cognate with
English self, it remains an intensifier used to mark reflexivity with non-
subject antecedents (the primary reflexive sich requiring a subject antecedent)
as in:
(36) Hans sprach mit Fritz iiber ihn (selbst)
Hans spoke with Fritz about him (himself)
[48] Faltz does not appear to have been aware of Hagege's work, and makes no reference to the
subjective point-of-view phenomena associated with long-distance reflexives, although he
discusses some of the classic logophoric languages like Ewe (1985: 252).
[49] Of course the derivation of a long-distance reflexive from a first person pronoun in a
language that has no system of indirect reported speech (in other words from a form
glossable as 'John said I will come' to a form 'John said self would come') would make
immediate sense of the logophoric associations of such pronouns. Faltz (1985: 263 ff.)
notes a number of problems for such a development, although it seems eminently plausible
for some of the African languages like Ewe. However, it is quite clear that this cannot be
the source of all such long-distance reflexives with associated logophoricity, since these are
(as Faltz notes, pp. 257 ff.) often (as in Igbo) clearly third-person in origin.
[50] The exceptions will be those derived from first person long-range-only 'reflexives', and any
C forms of the 'body-his' kind that may have been directly coined.
[51] The evidence is of different kinds; the weakest is mere overlap in function between
emphatics and reflexive morphemes; stronger evidence, as in the case of Papago, is where
this is reinforced by comparison with related languages where the morpheme only has a
reflexive function; best of all, of course, as in the rest of the cited languages, is where there




In (36) without the addition of selbst reference of ihn is likely to be taken to
be a third party, but with selbst the referent is taken to be Fritz (Faltz, 1985:
240). Note that selbst is also synchronically an intensifier
(37) Der Prasident selbst wird kommen
'The President himself will come'
and a focus particle:
(38) Selbst der Prasident wird kommen
' Even the President will come'
the different scopes perhaps being responsible for the meaning differ-
ences in these usages (Edmondson & Plank, 1978; Konig, 1991, Ch. 8).
Diachronically, the NP intensification use seems to be prior to all the others
(Konig, op. cit.).
Although Faltz's account antedates the great upsurge of work on binding,
it seems still to be the most comprehensive cross-linguistic survey of
reflexivization available (although see also Geniusiene, 1987; Sells, Zaenen &
Zee, 1987) and it suggests that the account we are advancing may have some
real cross-linguistic generality. Nevertheless, the evidence is still relatively
thin, and still relatively biased by data from Indo-European languages.
Clearly, we need much more work on the history of reflexives in those
languages like Tamil, Chinese, Japanese, and others that provide long
continuous records. In the history of all three of these languages, we can find
evidence for at least a precondition for the reflexives-from-emphatics
hypothesis, namely evidence for overlap in function of the same morpheme(s)
for both emphasis and reflexivity. Thus, Classical Chinese zi clearly had both
reflexive and emphatic uses like modern Chinese ziji.M Ancient Japanese had
a range of reflexives that also functioned as subject intensifies or
emphatics;53 modern zibun orjibun (they/-morpheme is written with the same
Chinese character as Classical zi and is obviously borrowed) clearly maintains
the emphatic adjunct function.54 Modern Tamil has the same tell-tale overlap
[52] Harbsmeier (1981: Ch. 3) contains some interesting material on Classical Chinese
reflexives; he claims that pronominal ji was a contrastive reflexive pronominal (related to,
but distinct from the nominal;/ referring to the Taoist 'Self; p. 178) with clausemate
antecedents, but also a non-contrastive long-distance reflexive requiring co-reference with
the subject of the highest clause (187); while zi clearly had emphatic functions of many
sorts, just like the adverbial uses of modern Mandarin ziji (Li & Thompson, 1981: 138).
[53] See Syromiatnikov (1981: 81 f.) who notes both reflexive and emphatic adjunct uses for
onore and midukara in Ancient Japanese (cf. Modern Japanese mizukara, an alternate to
zibun, Hinds, 1986: 116). These seem to be bleached head nominals (kara means 'body'),
a common reflexive source classified by Faltz (1985) as a kind of C pronoun.
[54] Although rarely mentioned in the recent theoretical literature on jibun/zibun (Kuno, 1973;
Hinds, 1986 and Sells, 1987 are all silent on this point), the emphatic functions figure
prominently in traditional pedagogical grammars. Thus, Vaccari & Vaccari (1948: 358 ff.)
list uses similar to English He himself came, I bought it myself; they even note the double
emphatic use of jibun jishin to translate 'you did it yourself (lit. ji-bun 'setf-parVJi-shin
'self-body').
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in function of the morpheme taan as an indeclinable NP intensifier and a
declinable (long-distance) reflexive; in Classical Tamil, the intensifier was a
declinable post-position (Andronov, 1969; 108). The tendency to pro-
nominalize is continuing in the more recent use of taan as a non-reflexive
honorific second (or sometimes third) person pronoun. Even in the present-
day language, the emphatic and the reflexive are more than mere
homophones: 'with regard to the emphatic marker taan, one might wish to
say that there is some semantic overlap with the reflexive pronoun taan',
another emphatic affix -ee sometimes also being used to indicate reflexivity
(Asher, 1985: 86). As Caldwell (i96i[i856]: 401) noted over a century ago,
Dravidian taan 'must, I think, have originated from some emphatic
demonstrative base', a conclusion supported by later comparative Dravidian
studies. For example, Gondi tanaa is 'only used in the third person and in the
nominative' (Burrow & Emeneau, 1961: 207), that is, I suspect, purely as an
emphatic adjunct.
Still, whatever the current empirical basis, the hypothesis seems plausible
enough, and it is certainly open to empirical refutation. It clearly makes
interesting predictions about the evolution of anaphoric patterns generally.
It suggests for example that languages with long-distance reflexives may be
mid-way between A-first and B-first patterns, and if so, we might expect a
greater flexibility in interpretation in such languages than in English. Chinese
is an interesting case in point, and it is worth seeing how the facts might be
incorporated into an account of this sort.
In a thorough re-examination of Chinese anaphora, Y. Huang (1989,
1990) claims (no doubt controversially, but nevertheless convincingly) that
no grammatical account of the GB-type will be able to handle the observed
flexibility of interpretation. Thus he argues for a pragmatic explanation of
the patterns, but he claims that my A-first account (as in Levinson, 1987 b)
will not work, largely because on that account there should be a strong
tendency (via Q-implicature) for the complementary interpretation of
Anaphors and Pronominals, whereas in Chinese that is not the case. Instead,
he opts for something close to my B-first account, making use only of M- and
I-implicatures (with that order of priority), together with a presumption of
intra-clause argument distinctness (attributable to I). This appears to work
well to predict the favoured anaphoric interpretations; in effect there is a
global tendency to locally co-referential readings of both the reflexive ziji and
the non-reflexive pronoun ta, a tendency defeated in the case of ta with a
potential clausemate antecedent by the presumption of core-argument
distinctness. But it is clear that Chinese does have, in the case of ziji, a
pronominal that is obligatorily referentially dependent (which we take to be
a semantic fact) without a clear syntactic specification of a binding domain.
The synchronic state of the language may then reflect a period of transition
towards an A-first system with grammaticalized Anaphors, with ziji being in
the process of acquiring the Q-contrasts so typical of A-first languages.
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Unfortunately, there seems to be no history of pronominals and reflexives
in Chinese easily accessible to the non-specialist. Perhaps some speculation
may be forgiven in the hope that specialists may be goaded into supplying us
with the facts. As already mentioned, ziji already in Classical Chinese had
both emphatic and reflexive uses, and it continues to be used as an intensifier,
for example in collocation with a subject (Li & Thompson, 1981: 138 f.).
Thus, on the hypothesis that ziji was in origin an emphatic, we can postulate
an earlier B-first state of the language with the following properties:
(a) INTRA-CLAUSAL ANAPHORIC PATTERNS : use of the pronominal ta would
tend to I-implicate local co-reference, except with clausemate antecedents
where the presumption of clausemate argument distinctness would block co-
reference. This presumption is over-ruled by the use of a marked, emphatic
ta ziji or ziji which would M-implicate the complementary interpretation,
here co-reference.
(b) CROSS-CLAUSE ANAPHORIC PATTERNS: here, where there is no pre-
sumption of disjoint reference, ta will tend to pick up a local antecedent. The
use of (ta) ziji will M-implicate a contrastive interpretation, but not
necessarily a contrast in reference (no longer especially salient, given the
irrelevance of the presumption of clausemate argument distinctness). The
contrast may be on the dimensions of unexpectedness, sole agency or non-
deictic ('logophoric') point of view.55
Later, through the usages in (a), ziji must have acquired specific semantic
content, namely necessary referential dependence.
In the modern language, given that ta encompasses both deictic and
anaphoric uses, there is now an ordering of semantic informativeness over
the two expressions, and thus the makings of a Horn-scale (.ziji, ta}, with the
use of the weaker ta suggesting that the use of ziji would be inappropriate.
But ziji, even in the present language, is not an Anaphor in the classic GB
sense, since it carries no specification of the domain in which it must be
bound (Y. Huang, 1989: 90 if.). The Q-opposition between ziji and ta is thus
rather weak - ziji is no more informative about where to find an antecedent,
[55] It is notable that in modern Chinese there is often a contrast in preferred referential
interpretation of embedded pronominals that favours a local antecedent for ta and a more
distant one for ziji. For example, Huang (1989: 91) notes of the following kind of example
that the favoured interpretation co-identifies Wang (rather than Li) and ziji:
(i) Lao Wang yiwei Lao Li bu zhidao ziji qu guo Meiguo
Lao Wang think Lao Li not know self go EXP America
'Wang thinks that Li doesn't know that self has been to America.'
This tendency for ziji linkage to skip over a good candidate antecedent which would have
been the favoured link with ta may therefore by partially explained by this pragmatic
theory (specifically, the M-contrast between ta and ziji). Huang (1989: 106 fn. 6) points out
that a similar pattern has been noted for Japanese. However, our account cannot be the
full explanation because even where there is no contrast with ta, ziji still prefers a more
distant antecedent. For instance, in a sentence with only one embedded clause glossable as
'Wang thinks Li has fallen in love with PRONOMINAL', the nearest antecedent, Li, is a
clausemate disfavouring identification with ta, but ziji would still naturally refer to Wang.
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and, after all, most pronominal uses are anaphoric, and thus referentially
dependent in any case. What will strengthen the opposition is the encoding
of contrast or unexpectedness, emphasis and 'logophoricity' associated with
ziji. The use of ta will therefore suggest (Q-implicate) that either the speaker
wishes to avoid referential dependence or that he wishes to avoid the
' logophoric' or contrastive associations of ziji. Where reference is the salient
issue (especially, where there is a potential intra-clause antecedent such that
the presumption of intra-clausal argument distinctiveness is pertinent), the
use of ta will strongly suggest disjoint reference,56 but elsewhere it is just as
likely to suggest non-contrastiveness or non-logophoricity. So we obtain the
following patterns of preferred interpretation (from Huang, 1989: ch. 3):
(40) (a) Lao Wang piping le ziji
Lao Wang criticize PFV self
'Wangj has criticized himself/
(b) Lao Wang piping le ta
Lao Wang criticize PFV 3SG
'Wangj has criticized him2'
(41) (a) Lao Wang shuo ziji shi ge gongchengshi
Lao Wang say self be CL engineer
' Wangj says that hej himself is an engineer'
(b) Lao Wang shuo ta shi ge gongchengshi
Lao Wang say 3SG be CL engineer
'Wangj says that hex is an engineer'
Thus disjoint vs. conjoint reference is the most salient opposition between ta
and ziji within the clause, while the subjective, ' logophoric' contrast is the
most salient opposition outside it. Y. Huang's (1989) own account of all this
is simpler: in (40b) the presumption of clausemate argument distinctness
over-rides the I-preference for local co-reference, while the latter in turn is
over-ridden by the semantics of referential dependency in (40a). In (41) the
preference for co-reference goes through unchecked.
Yet Huang's account leaves questions unanswered, for example why the
ta/ziji opposition fails to form a Q-implicating Horn-scale. It also, perhaps,
hides the cross-linguistic generality of these patterns: if we bring the
subjective meaning (' logophoric') contrasts back into the picture we can see
why we can have a pragmatic contrast without a change of reference. These
contrasts, subtle though they are, are surely a prominent part of these
systems, partially eclipsed by the focus on referential potential in grammatical
theory, but correctly emphasized in recent work by O'Connor (1987), Kuno
(1987), Sells (1987), Stirling (1988) and others. The contrast between ta and
[56] That this is only a suggestion was clear, Huang (1989: 54) points out, to traditional
grammarians of Chinese; he quotes Wang Li: 'As for ta ma ta ("He rebukes him"), it is
ambiguous: it can mean either "he rebukes himself" or "he rebukes another person"'.
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ziji is therefore often interpreted non-referentially, as acknowledged in
Huang (1990), where ziji is claimed to carry an 'unexpectedness message'
indicating either logophoric viewpoint or contrastiveness, when used in
positions where a pronoun or zero anaphor could have the same reference.
We are also enabled to see rather striking parallels, for example between
(in just this limited respect) modern Chinese and Old (and Middle) English.
Consider, for example, the possibility of the following anaphoric links.57
(42) (a) Wang Xiaojie feichang xinshang ta ziji
Wang Miss very admire 3SG self
Miss Wangj admires her-herself2 very much
(b) Moyses, se &e waes Gode sua weord dast he oft
Moses he who was to God so dear that he often
wid hine selfne spraec
with himself spoke
'MoseSi, who was so dear to God2 that hej often spoke with
[God] himself/
The seeming paradox of these usages (with ' reflexives' and plain pronominals
having reversed functions) evaporates if we keep in mind the emphatic
origins of the reflexive: then we can see that a pronominal plus an emphatic
might naturally send one (via M-implicature) to the complement of the (co-
referential) interpretation that would have been most salient from the use of
a simple pronoun. Likewise, the parallels to Chinese in the 'long-range
reflexive' uses of the -self forms in Old English can be brought out:
(43) (a) Xiaoming yiwei mama yao zeguai ziji le
Xiaoming think mum will blame self CRS
Xiaoming! thinks that Mum2 will blame sel^
(b) He [Gregorius] ^Elmihtigne God baed ]?aet
he Almighty God prayed that
' He! prayed to Almighty God2 that
he hi mid his gife gescylde:
he to them with his grace should bestow
He2 should bestow His2 grace upon them:
7 )?aet he him seolfum forgeafe ]?aet
& that he to him self would grant that
and that He2 to himself would grant that
[57] The Chinese example is from Huang, 1989: 96, the source of the Old English example is
cited in footnote 38 (see Mitchell, 1985: 115). I am grateful to April McMahon for help in
interpreting the Old English examples.
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he moste done wsestm heora gewinnes
he might the fruits of their labours
he2 might see the fruits of their labours
in heofona rices wuldre geseon.
in heaven's kingdom's glory see
in the glory of the Kingdom of Heaven.'
In the Chinese, the search for an antecedent for ziji can happily leap over a
clausemate subject, finding an antecedent in a matrix clause (Huang, 1989:
50;, 91 ff.). Similarly, Mitchell (1985: 194) argues that him seolfum in this
extract from Bede ' refers to Gregorius, the subject of the main clause, and
not to God, the subject of the clause in which it stands'. Thus the passage
glossed ' Hex prayed to Almighty God2... that He2 would grant to himselfj...'
has just the same pattern of anaphora as the Chinese sentence. Mitchell
points out that often the -self form in Old English ' is in effect reflexive,
though not grammatically so' in just this way.
These are surely striking parallels across time and linguistic phylogeny. In
both Old (and perhaps especially later Middle) English and Chinese, we seem
to be dealing with a flexible system of anaphoric interpretation, with only
very partial coding of' Anaphoricity' (that is to say referential dependency
within a restricted domain), where the referentially dependent pronominal
clearly has primordial emphatic or intensification functions which continue
to effect its use. In the case of English, we know the further direction of
development, towards true Anaphors with restrictive binding domains; it
may not be entirely fanciful to imagine that Chinese is heading in the same
direction, towards an A-first system. But regardless of that, the categories A-
first, B-first and 'in-between' may provide a useful, if crude, first step
towards a cross-linguistic typology of anaphoric systems, providing that they
are taken together with the pragmatic principles that generate the patterns
and severely restrict the possibilities of preferred interpretation.
5. C O N C L U S I O N S
This paper has re-examined my earlier A-first account (Levinson, 1987 a, b),
which attempts to reduce Binding Conditions B and C to matters of
generalized conversational implicature using the apparatus independently
motivated by much work in pragmatics. I have tried to deal with some of the
difficulties that have arisen, and in so doing have shown how the account
may be extended to cover some of the facts about long-distance reflexives and
the overlapping distribution of pronouns and reflexives with the same
reference. However, the A-first account is clearly inapplicable to languages
that lack reflexives altogether, so for such B-first languages I have shown how
the same Gricean pragmatic principles can be used to predict a rather
different strategy for indicating co-reference and disjoint reference. While the
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A-first account explains how anaphoric patterns are projected from Gricean
principles applied to grammaticalized Anaphors, the B-first account shows
how grammaticalized Anaphors might arise in the first place. Thus it seems
natural to suppose that all A-first languages have derived from B-first ones.
If we take this diachronic perspective, linking our A-first and B-first
accounts, we are then provided with a plausible account - it would seem for
the first time - of the persistent association of logophoricity and long-range
reflexives.
Such an account of anaphoric patterns in terms of a theory of preferred
interpretation of the sort offered by the neo-Gricean theory of generalized
conversational implicature is interesting for a number of reasons. First, it
seems to fall out of independently motivated Gricean principles, together
with reasonably intricate projection rules for inconsistent potential impli-
catures (especially the hierarchy of preference Q > M > I). The system is rich
enough to make strong restrictive predictions, and that they happen to be in
the right direction is encouraging. Secondly, an account of this sort integrates
the facts about ' logophoricity' which on a grammatical account (at least in
GB terms58) are irrelevant and unexplained. Thirdly, it makes interesting
typological and diachronic predictions, which seem to fit the fragmentary
evidence in so far as I control it.
The integration of a pragmatic account of anaphora with a diachronic
perspective is natural, but nonetheless in need of further development.
Clearly, on this account, anaphoric patterns are accretions of habitual usages
motivated by rational functional principles, but which in becoming
conventionalized make available yet further pragmatic exploitations. The
patterns are learnable on the basis of evidence for the use of language taken
together with the rational principles underlying language use. The time scale
for 'evolution' of one system into another (say a B-first system into an A-first
system), or of the emergence of true Anaphors, may be measured in hundreds
of years. All this, of course, seems clearly at variance with a GB perspective,
where anaphoric patterns are instantiations of mental templates, are
considered to be in principle unlearnable, and where parameter switching can
only take place within the space of a single generation.
The general issues raised call for far more detailed discussion than space
allows here. But it is essential to emphasize that there is no general challenge
here to some concept of a rich, restrictive innate linguistic ability or
Universal Grammar. Nevertheless the possibility of a pragmatic account of
the core patterns of anaphora must raise doubts about whether these play as
central a part in our innate linguistic endowment as so much current
linguistic theorizing presumes. Equally, there is no suggestion here that the
current patterns of anaphora in, say, English, are entirely pragmatic - rather
[58] See though such works as Hellan (1988) where an attempt is made to integrate the
logophoric facts with a binding account.
154
REDUCTION OF BINDING CONDITIONS
that the central facts can be seen to have functional motivation, that
diachronic explanations might refer more to pragmatic principles than to
principles of UG, and that defeasibilities of interpretation, at the margins as
it were, are the stigmata of the functional origin of currently grammaticalized
patterns. Thus the presumed inability of a pragmatic account to predict, for
example, the details of reflexives in so-called Raising or Exceptional Case
Marking contexts (as in John believes himself to be ill) does not undermine the
thrust of the argument: once a language has grammaticalized an A-first
system, such a system will have to treat such weakened clause boundaries one
way or the other, as permeable or impermeable barriers to binding.
Two specific issues however should be briefly taken up - the implications
for language learning and language change. The facts adduced above about
B-first languages and their slow mutation into A-first languages do not sit
well with the kind of language learning model associated with GB. Take for
example Wexler and Manzini's (1987) account of the parameterization of the
Binding Conditions. For a language to be learnable despite the absence of
'negative evidence' (feedback that certain sentences are ungrammatical),
there must be some mechanism to stop overgeneralization, such as a
preference for the ' smallest' language consistent with the data. Wexler and
Manzini suggest this is achieved by ensuring that for any two values i and j
of a parameter P, the language L(/) generated by the i value will be a proper
subset of the language L(/) generated by they value (the 'subset principle').
The Binding Conditions can be parameterized by varying (to put it
informally) the 'size' of the binding domain or minimal governing category
(MGC). For example, a very general specification as for English binding
(minimal S or NP with a subject) will result in a ' smaller' MGC than a very
specific requirement (like indicative clause) that will result in a ' larger' MGC
as for Icelandic long reflexives. Then one can generalize: the 'smaller' the
MGC or binding domain for Anaphors, the 'smaller' the language.
Consequently, the language learner should assume the smallest MGC
compatible with the data, and the unmarked value (or initial setting) of the
parameter will specify the minimal MGC. However, applying the same
reasoning to pronominals gives the reverse prediction: the ' larger' the MGC
or binding domain for Pronominals, the 'smaller' the language. Therefore
Wexler and Manzini relativize the binding domain parameter to specific
lexical items, specific Anaphors or Pronominals as the case may be (they
adduce Icelandic data that seem to require this anyway), not without an
unhappy loss of any language-wide generalizations.
Consider now the facts about B-first languages in the light of such a
learning theory. In a B-first language, as we have seen, pronouns can be
referentially dependent, or not, in any domain whatsoever. If we treat them
as Anaphors, then the MGC in which they must be bound is maximal (root
S or discourse) and the resulting language is maximal and highly marked. If
we treat them as Pronominals, the MGC in which they must be free is
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minimal (NP or smaller) and the resulting language is maximal and highly
marked. If we treat them as ambiguous, such languages would present no
evidence for determining the extent of the MGC and no criteria for a
principled distinction between Anaphor and Pronominal.68 If we treat them
as simultaneously BOTH Anaphors and Pronominals then they should have
the highly restricted distribution of PRO. But think of the dilemma for the
language learner: how could he or she ever determine the categorization into
Pronominal or Anaphor? And if ambiguity was suspected, how could the
evidence resolve which homophonous instance was a Pronominal or an
Anaphor? Now consider that the evidence would seem to show that early
stages of pidgins and Creoles are B-first languages, as discussed above, with
the frequent use of non-reflexive pronouns as Anaphors. Recollect too that
children seem to use non-reflexive pronouns readily as Anaphors in the same
way. Indeed, in Solan's (1987) experiments, four to six-year-olds interpreted
English non-reflexive pronouns as ' free' Pronominals on average only 34 %
of the time. Thus in both pidgin and Creole languages and in child language
we find properties typical of B-first languages. The Wexler and Manzini
results would make these properties the most marked settings of the Binding
parameters - as far from the presumed initial UG settings as possible! This
is clearly not the right result.60
Consider by contrast an emergent A-first language, with emphatic NPs
beginning to act routinely as Anaphors with clausemate antecedents. The
language learner looking for an Anaphor might correctly detect these NPs as
candidates, might attempt to analyze them as locally bound within a minimal
MGC, but would find other co-referential emphatic NPs homophonous in
form in non-local positions, and would be led (one would expect) to the
maximal marked setting of the MGC. On a theory, like Wexler and
Manzini's, which necessarily decouples the parameter settings of MGCs for
Anaphors and Pronominals, it is hard to see how to get the language learner
to focus on the crucial opposition between alternative realizations of
clausemate NPs.61
Compare all these difficulties now with the comparable ones for a
pragmatic account. The evidence for the Q- and I-principles abound in many
aspects of language data (see for instance Atlas & Levinson, 1981; Levinson,
[59] For an attempt to argue for ambiguity, see Chung (1989). More generally, theorists like
Koster (1986: 341 fT.) seem willing to propose that pronouns are ambiguously Anaphors
and Pronominals while reflexives may equally be Anaphors or Pronominals (as in John
himself came), without considering the implications for a theory of acquisition.
[60] There are other inconsistent findings: for instance, Sigurjonsdottir & Hyams (1988) have
found that children learn the use of the Icelandic long reflexive sig relatively early, without
passing through a stage of experimenting with more minimal MGCs. See the discussion in
Lightfoot, 1989: 370-371.
[61] Although Lightfoot's (1989) idea that, despite appearances to the contrary, all parameters
can be (and therefore presumably should be) set on the basis of root clause phenomena
might offer some succour.
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1987a, b; Horn, 1985, 1989, etc.). True, it is not clear exactly how the learner
comes to formulate such principles, some like Sperber and Wilson (1986)
presuming that something similar to them derives directly from innate
predispositions to process information in certain ways, others like Grice and
those who follow him more closely (including the present author) imagining
that they arise from some complex interaction between native rationality and
the demands of the communication setting (see Levinson, 1989). Be that as
it may, such inferential principles (or something like them) indubitably exist
and are clearly utilized (to growing extents) by the language learner, as are
many other not specifically linguistic inferential procedures. Patterns of
anaphora will then be inspected to see whether they can be treated as
instantiations of Q- or M-oppositions to the I-based tendency to stereotypical
readings. If anaphoric patterns are learnt this way, then there are clear
predictions for acquisition based on the fact that the patterns arise from
contrastive opposition. For example, in an A-first language, where Principle
B patterns are parasitic on Principle A patterns, Principle A patterns would
have to be learnt first. And so in fact they seem to be.62 This is in contrast
to the Wexler and Manzini predictions, which not only decouple A and B
patterns, but relativize them to particular lexical instantiations of Anaphors
and Pronominals; there is no reason then why B patterns might not come
first.
Let us turn finally to the implications of all this for language change. The
parameter setting model has implications of course for how one would expect
such change to occur: Lightfoot (1989: 325) suggests it should happen
because a structural reanalysis by the language learner of some syntactic
patterns (a parameter switch) may force certain data to be ignored as
'impossible data', not part of the 'trigger (parameter setting) experience'.
Vincent (1989a: 361) comments that one would then expect a certain special
kind of obsolescence, notable for ' the relatively sudden disappearance from
attested sources'. For example, once a himself form is analyzed as an
Anaphor bound within a minimal MGC, one might expect rapid loss of
homophonous forms bound further afield; or once him is analyzed as a
Pronominal free in a maximal MGC, one would expect rapid squeezing out
of the use of him as a reflexive. The loss should take place in transmission
across one generation, and although one must allow for sociolinguistic
diffusion across a population, individuals' usage should be consistent
[62] Apart from the delayed acquisition of Binding B patterns found by Solan and others
mentioned above, Reinhart (1986: 140-142) notes that findings about childrens' use of
backward anaphora favour treating Binding B patterns as pragmatic. She argues that the
data support her particular A-first analysis, with all types of bound anaphora collectively
distinguished from pragmatic anaphora. Her argument, like ours, is based on the




(Lightfoot, 1989: 370).63 But again none of these predictions seem true of
the history of anaphora in English, or indeed other languages, where the
establishment of for example Principle B type patterns of usage began in
Anglo-Saxon times but was still not complete in Shakespeare's. All this
suggests that if language learning does indeed generally proceed by the
setting of parameters, the view that Binding domains are candidate
parameters does not have obvious empirical support from the facts of
acquisition or the indirect effects that modes of acquisition might have on
language change.
There are striking cross-linguistic parallels in anaphoric patterns. There
are also some striking exceptions to what we have come to expect (like the
B-first languages). Finding a satisfactory explanation of both the deep
parallels and the anomalies is going to be difficult. It will clearly involve a
universal theory of construal tendencies and the way this interacts with
language specific details. One model for such an explanation is a
parameterized Binding theory interacting with other parameters in an innate
language learning device. Another model, the one being suggested here, is a
universal pragmatic theory that covers the anaphoric tendencies, interacting
with language specific details that are partly historical accretions of practices.
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